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Thomas Jeﬀerson’s Carriage: Arizona v. Gant’s
Assault on the Belton Doctrine
By Andrew Fois And LAuren simmons1

o

n april 21, 2009, in an important ruling for
all criminal justice practitioners, the United
states supreme Court upended the long
standing law regarding searches of the passenger compartments of automobiles incident to arrest
of the occupants thereof. in Arizona v. Gant,2 the Court
took on the twenty-eight-year-old rule governing such
searches established by its holding in Belton v. New
York.3 in doing so, the Court has created new standards
that will inevitably lead to confusion and increased litigation over this issue for
years to come.
to begin to understand the road the Court traveled from Belton to Gant,
21st century criminal justice
practitioners need to close
their eyes and imagine the
following scenario: thomas
Jefferson, with the Declaration of independence in
hand, is racing through the
streets of Philadelphia in his
late 18th century-style horsedrawn carriage on his way to
independence hall. Colonial
law enforcement officers observe his violation of city speed limits, pull Jefferson’s
carriage to the side of the dirt road, and arrest him. in
such a situation, what would Jefferson or his colleagues,
who will go on to draft the Bill of rights, consider a reasonable search? Would they object to the late 20th century supreme Court’s reading of the fourth
amendment? or would the framers have no trouble
with the search of the interior passenger compartment
of Jefferson’s carriage, as well as any wig boxes they
may find therein?
this colonial criminal procedural issue matters
to criminal practitioners today because it was the question on the mind of Justice antonin scalia during the
oral arguments in the Gant case. in Gant, the supreme
Court was asked to revisit its holding in Belton; in Belton, the Court defined the constitutional scope of the exception to the fourth amendment’s Warrant Clause for
4

searches of vehicles incident to a lawful arrest of their
occupants. at issue before the Court in Gant was the
continuing viability of the Belton doctrine authorizing
law enforcement officers to search the entire interior
compartment of an automobile, as well as any containers
therein, contemporaneously with the arrest of a recent
occupant of that vehicle. the automobile arrest exception to the warrant requirement was intended to protect
the physical safety of the arresting police officers and
to prevent the destruction of evidence inside of the car.
Police, prosecutors, and defense counsel should read the
Gant decision carefully because the ruling creates a new,
or at least modified, rule for
how such searches may be
constitutionally conducted.
these changes will significantly alter how practitioners
conduct litigation in this important area.
in an effort to decide the
future of Belton, at least one
Justice
considered
the
framers’ original intent in
writing the fourth amendment. Justice scalia became
frustrated with arizona’s reliance on law enforcement’s
use of procedures endorsed in Belton over the almost
three decades since the issuance of that opinion.4 as an
originalist, Justice scalia had a much longer timeline in
mind and was anxious to hear about the framers’ experiences with the issue of searches incident to arrest in
18th century vehicles. “if you stopped thomas Jefferson’s carriage to arrest thomas Jefferson,” Justice scalia
asked of counsel for arizona, “and you pulled him off
to the side of the road, could you . . . then go up and
search his carriage?”5 Justice scalia was disappointed
by arizona’s slightly flummoxed counsel’s inability to
shed any light on the question of what kind of treatment
the primary author of the Declaration of independence
would have expected from colonial law enforcement authorities.6 the significance of Justice scalia’s question
is that it revealed the degree to which he was willing to
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reconsider the well-established precedent of Belton.
scalia was pleading with counsel to give him something
“to hang [his] hat on” from the framers’ original understanding of what they may have viewed as a reasonable
search under the “carriage exception” to the warrant requirement.7
this article will consider the state of the postcolonial law leading up to the Court’s decision in Belton,
the Belton case itself, and its progeny. then, it will discuss the arizona supreme Court’s holding and reasoning in Gant. it will analyze the positions on both sides
and analyze the questions that each justice raised during
oral arguments. it will propose grounds on which the
Court could have decided Gant and assess what each
would have meant for the criminal justice practitioner.
finally, it will discuss the significance of the Court’s ruling in Gant.
Pre-Belton: Chimel v. CAliFoRniA anD PrOGeny8
in Chimel v. California,9 the United states
supreme Court sought to explain the “search incident to
arrest” exception to the fourth amendment’s warrant
requirement and limit its application to the extent supported by the rationale for the rule. armed with a warrant for Chimel’s arrest, three police officers went to
Chimel’s home to arrest him for the burglary of a coin
shop. as he was being arrested, Chimel denied an officer’s request for permission to search his home. Despite
Chimel’s refusal to give consent, the officers, citing their
authority to conduct a search incident to the arrest,
searched his home and seized evidence linking him to
the burglary.10
the supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether the search of petitioner’s whole house could be
justified as incident to his lawful arrest therein.11 the
Court expressed its intent to clarify the scope of the
search incident to arrest doctrine, noting that its own jurisprudence on the issue had been “far from consistent.”12 the Court began its analysis in Chimel by
rejecting the twenty-eight-year-old standard it had announced in United States v. Rabinowitz13 to govern the
scope of a warrantless search incident to arrest. Rabinowitz permitted such a search to extend to the area in
the “possession” or “under the control” of the arrestee.14
noting the broad sense in which the lower court applied
the Rabinowitz standard to petitioner Chimel, the Court
found it neither “historical nor rational.”15
the Chimel Court walked through the various
scenarios typically faced by police officers when makCriminal Law Brief

ing an arrest. it then analyzed the scope of a permissible
search incident to arrest by reference to the rationale for
that search. thus, the Court found it reasonable for an
officer to search the person of an arrestee in order to
seize any weapons that he may use to threaten the officer’s safety or “resist arrest or effect his escape.”16 the
Court declared that it was also reasonable to search for
or seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order
to “prevent its concealment or destruction.”17 the Court
then limited the scope of a permissible search beyond
the actual person of the arrestee only to that area to
which these twin rationales apply.18 the area to which
these two rationales apply, the Court held, is that area
“‘within [the arrestee’s] immediate control’ . . . within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”19 the Court thus modified the Rabinowitz standard by forbidding the warrantless search of
any area within the arrestee’s “possession” and narrowing it to that area not merely “under [his] control” but
rather “within his immediate control.”20
setting up the choice as one between “a search
of the person arrested and the area within his reach” on
the one hand and “more extensive searches” on the
other, the Court chose the former.21 the search of
Chimel’s home beyond the area within his immediate
control was unconstitutional if based solely on the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant clause.
lower courts were left to apply Chimel’s “within
the arrestee’s immediate control” doctrine on a case-bycase basis. their efforts to define the permissible scope
of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest proved
difficult and inconsistent.22 in response to the struggles
of the lower courts, the supreme Court began to adopt
bright-line rules to determine the permissible scope of
searches incident to arrest, at least as it applied to the
timing of the search. in United States v. Edwards,23 Justice Byron White, writing for the majority, stated that
“searches and seizures that could be made on the spot
at the time of the arrest may legally be conducted later
when the accused arrives at the place of detention.”24
the Court justified extending the permissible search
doctrine in Edwards because “the normal processes incident to arrest and custody had not yet been completed
when edwards was placed in his cell.”25 this is broadened from the scope of Chimel because at the time respondent was searched, there was neither a danger to the
officer nor a risk of destruction of any evidence—the
original Chimel rationales for the warrantless search.
in United States v. Robinson,26 the supreme
Court drew another bright-line rule delineating the per5

missible scope of the search of the person of an arrestee
incident to his arrest.27 in that case, robinson was
legally arrested for driving an automobile after his operator’s permit was revoked.28 During a full custodial
search of robinson’s person, the arresting officer discovered a crumpled up cigarette package containing
packets of heroin in robinson’s breast pocket.29 the evidence was admitted in his trial and led to his conviction
for a narcotics offense.30
for purposes of its analysis, the supreme Court
divided the well-established exception to the warrant requirement for searches incident to arrest into two propositions: (1) “a search may be made of the person of the
arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest” alone and (2) “a
search may be made of the area within the control of the
arrestee.”31 the Court contrasted its decisions on these
two propositions noting that the law regarding the search
of the arrestee’s person has been settled and consistently
applied,32 while the extent of the area which may be
searched has been “subject to differing interpretations.”33
the D.C. Circuit Court had reasoned that even
a search of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest is limited by the possible presence of weapons or evidence.
it found that there was no reason to expect that evidence
would be revealed by a full body search.34 the Circuit
Court also narrowed the scope of authority to search
based upon a risk of concealment or destruction of evidence to such evidence that may relate to the offense for
which the arrestee was being brought into custody.35 in
reversing the appellate court, the supreme Court emphatically rejected a limitation of the search of robinson’s person to one only for weapons as well as the
Circuit Court’s “suggestion that there must be litigated
in each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a
search of the person incident to a lawful arrest.”36
the Court rejected a standard that would require
a case-by-case, totality of the circumstances analysis to
determine whether the arrestee may pose a threat to the
safety of the officer or be in a position to conceal or destroy specifically relevant evidence. “the authority to
search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation
that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
the person of the suspect.”37 it is the lawful arrest itself
that justifies the search of the arrestee’s person, not the
possibility under the circumstances of the case that
6

weapons or evidence might be found.38
thus, the Court drew a clear bright-line rule that
allows the police, upon arrest of a person, to conduct a
full search of that person, as well as any containers
found on his person. of course, the rationale underpinning the rule is the protection of the officer’s safety and
prevention of destruction of any evidence the arrestee
may be carrying. the permissible scope of the search,
however, is not “narrowly limited by [those] twin rationales.”39
While the Robinson Court “established an automatic right to search everything found on a person who
has been subjected to a custodial arrest,”40 it was silent
about whether that automatic power extended to containers or packages found within the arrestee’s “immediate control.”41
new YoRk v. Belton’S “BriGhT-line” rule
in 1981, the supreme Court addressed the issue
of the permissible scope of searches incident to arrests
in automobiles in New York v. Belton.42 on april 9,
1978, respondent roger Belton was riding in an automobile that sped past state trooper Douglas nicot who
was on routine patrol in an unmarked car on the new
york thruway.43 nicot chased down the car, ordered its
driver to pull over to the side of the road, and found that
the car was occupied by four men, including Belton.44
after requesting the driver’s license and the vehicle registration, nicot discovered that none of the four men
owned the car.45
While making these routine inquiries, trooper
nicot was able to smell an odor he recognized to be that
of burnt marijuana.46 he saw an envelope on the floor
of the car with the name of a brand of marijuana marked
on it.47 trooper nicot ordered all four men out of the
car and placed each under arrest for unlawful possession
of marijuana.48 after patting down each arrestee, nicot
separated them so that they were unable to reach each
other.49 he then returned to the car and picked up the
envelope in which he found marijuana.50 trooper nicot
then conducted a body search of each of the arrestees.51
he next conducted a search of the entire passenger compartment of the car; nicot found a black leather jacket
belonging to Belton on the back seat of the vehicle.52
nicot searched the jacket, unzipped a closed pocket, and
found what he suspected to be cocaine.53 he seized the
jacket and the envelope of marijuana and drove Belton
and the other three arrestees to the closest police station.54
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Belton was charged with, and found guilty of, Court, lamenting that difficulty, extolled the virtues of
criminal possession of a controlled substance.55 his pre- a clear set of rules for the fourth amendment that potrial motion to suppress the cocaine that trooper nicot lice, citizens, and courts can easily understand and conhad found in his jacket was denied.56 he appealed the sistently apply.63 as applied to searches of the person,
denial of his motion to the new york Court of appeals such a “straightforward rule, easily applied and preand the Court of appeals reversed.57 the appellate court dictably enforced” could be found in the Court’s holding
held that the search of the jacket and the seizure of the in United States v. Robinson.64 the Court expressed its
cocaine were unconstitutional because “there was no disappointment that no such rule has “emerged from the
longer any danger that the arrestee or a confederate litigated cases” regarding the issue in Belton.65
the Court, determined to take the matter into its
might gain access to the article.”58 thus, new york’s
highest court was interpreting the search incident to law- own hands, announced two bright-line rules in Belton.
ful arrest doctrine, as it applies to arrests involving au- Both rules involved the constitutionally permissible
tomobiles, as being limited in scope to the extent scope of searches of the surrounding areas of arrestees
necessary to support its underlying rationales of the ar- who are recent occupants of automobiles.66 the first
resting officer’s safety or the integrity of any evidence rule dealt with the interior compartment of the vehicle
of criminal activity. the same rationales would later be and the second with packages or other containers inside
that passenger compartment.
used by the arizona supreme Court
as for the first rule, the Court
to invalidate the search in Gant. it
[T]here
may
be
a
disheld that “[i]n order to establish
is beyond dispute, of course, that the
search incident to arrest doctrine aptinction between the the workable rule that this category of cases requires . . . we hold
plies to arrests made of individuals
scope
of
searches
perthat when a policeman has made a
who had been riding in automobiles
as much as it does to those merely
mitted incident to au- lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as
walking along the street. the issue
tomobile arrests and a contemporaneous incident of
the supreme Court faced in New
York v. Belton, as expressed by Jussearches incident to that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automotice Potter stewart who authored the
other arrest scenarios bile.”67 the supreme Court remajority opinion, was “[w]hen the
jected the argument that the court
occupant of an automobile is subnot involving autobelow found persuasive: that the
jected to a lawful custodial arrest,
mobiles.
search was unconstitutional bedoes the constitutionally permissicause the four men were no longer
ble scope of a search incident to his
within the reach of the passenger
arrest include the passenger com59
compartment of the automobile at the time of the search.
partment of the automobile in which he was riding?”
this expression of the issue, referring to the scope of ar- the men had been separated and under the control of
rests in automobiles, implies that there may be a distinc- the officer early in the encounter.68 Despite the fact that
tion between the scope of searches permitted incident to the officer was outnumbered four to one, there was no
automobile arrests and searches incident to other arrest evidence in the record that the occupants posed a danger
to his safety by virtue of a potential weapon in the car.
scenarios not involving automobiles.
the supreme Court began its analysis in Belton neither was there any evidence that any of the arrestees
by acknowledging the difficulty that courts were expe- were in a position to destroy or conceal evidence in the
riencing in applying the Chimel rule, especially as it re- car. nevertheless, the supreme Court upheld the search
lated to arrests of the occupants of automobiles. Chimel, of the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle
of course, defined the constitutionally permissible scope which the arrestees had recently occupied based on the
of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest as lim- arrest alone.
ited to the area within the immediate control of the arthe second bright-line rule promulgated by Bel60
the Court acknowledged, however, that ton regarded containers in the automobile’s passenger
restee.
“courts have found no workable definition of [this area] compartment. the supreme Court went on to rule that
when that area arguably61 includes the interior of an au- “[i]t follows from [the conclusion that police officers
tomobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant.”62 the may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle] that
Criminal Law Brief
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the police may also examine the contents of any containers69 found within the passenger compartment, for if
the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach.”70
the Court’s imprecise language about the containers being as much within reach of the arrestee as the
passenger compartment is unfortunate. it suggests
wrongly that the search of the passenger compartment
is predicated upon it being actually within the reach of
the arrestee; a requirement it has clearly rejected. however, the Court assumed that the passenger compartment
and the containers would actually be within reach in
most cases.71 aside from the automobile arrest scenario,
the entire search incident to arrest doctrine assumes the
value of a clear line based upon the danger to the officer
and of the destruction of evidence that is inherent in the
nature of an arrest. accordingly, a bright-line rule is
needed for “predictability and ease of application.”72
as has been recognized by commentators, the
line can be drawn in any number of different places.
the Belton Court explained that the reason for its placement of the line where it did was that, in reality, the accessibility of the passenger compartment and containers
therein will be the case more often than not.73 the majority is making the educated wager that they would
more often be right than wrong; thus justifying those
rare instances in which there are no opportunities for a
suspect to access weapons or evidence. Whether this is
empirically true, especially at present, is open to question. it may be true that the arrestee may more frequently be in handcuffs in the police car when the search
of the automobile is conducted. that, of course, was the
issue presented in Gant as will be discussed below.
two places where the Court did not draw brightline rules were the questions of whether arrestees were
“recent occupants” of the vehicle and whether the search
of the car incident to the arrests was “contemporaneous”
with the arrests themselves. fleshing out these two temporal requirements has led to considerable litigation and
served to protect and justify the rationales of officer
safety and protection of any evidence in the car. the
temporal requirements go a long way to confirming the
continued viability of the rationales while maintaining
the bright-line rules regarding the scope of the search.74
an alternative to the bright-line rule would have
been a holding that a search of an automobile’s interior
and any containers therein can be conducted only if the
recent occupants pose an actual, provable threat to the
safety of the police officer or to the integrity of any evidence of the suspected crime or otherwise. this stan8

dard, however, would have proven confusing and potentially dangerous for police to apply.75 it would have
required trial courts to undertake a case-by-case evaluation of when, during the course of each particular arrest
situation, either a threat to the officer or to the integrity
of the evidence existed. any search of a car and containers therein would no longer be permissible once both
of the twin dangers had subsided. such a determination
would involve factual hearings at which the court would
have to make fine distinctions. Prosecutors, police, defense counsel, and judges would need to be prepared for
additional litigation in most, if not all, car arrest cases.76
in addition to these difficult factual determinations,
there would still be a need for findings on the twin
Chimel rationales.
the supreme Court went on in several other
cases to reaffirm its holding and rationale for the bright
line rules it announced in Belton.77 almost every court
that has considered the bright-line rules at both the federal and state levels has acknowledged and adopted the
bright-line rules without regard to limitations imposed
by the need to satisfy the underlying rationales.78 some
state courts have declined to follow Belton’s lead regarding the bright-line rules when they are interpreting their
own state constitutions.79 some other courts, while accepting the constitutional ruling in Belton, have found
it inapplicable for a variety of reasons.80 some expert
commentary has defended the bright-line rules of Belton81 while a considerable amount has been generally
critical of the Court’s approach.82
thRonton v. United StAteS83
twenty-three years after its opinion in Belton,
and just four years before granting certiorari in Gant,
the supreme Court took up a case resembling the hypotheticals that Justice Brennan’s dissent proffered in Belton and brightened the bright-line rule it drew in that
case. the issue presented in Thornton v. United States
was whether the rule in Belton “is limited to situations
where the officer makes contact with the occupant while
the occupant is inside the vehicle, or whether it applies
as well when the officer first makes contact with the arrestee after the latter has stepped out of his vehicle.”84
the answer the Court provided to that question underscores the conclusion that a search incident to the arrest
of a recent occupant of a vehicle does not depend on the
arrestee’s actual ability to reach weapons or evidence in
the passenger compartment.
Winter 2009

norfolk, virginia Police officer Deion nichols
was in uniform driving an unmarked police car when he
noticed petitioner thornton driving a lincoln town
Car.85 officer nichols observed thornton slow down
and avoid driving directly next to nichols’ car, and suspected that thornton recognized him to be a police officer and that he was trying to hide something from
him.86 nichols pulled over, noted the license plate of
thornton’s car, and found that they were registered to a
different model car.87
Based on this information, nichols prepared to
pull thornton over.88 Before he was able to do so,
thornton pulled off the road into a parking lot and got
out of the vehicle.89 officer nichols parked behind
thornton, stopped him as he was walking away from
his car, and asked for his license.90 nichols thought that
thornton appeared nervous—thornton began speaking
incoherently, sweating, and licking his lips.91 thinking
thornton could be armed and dangerous, officer
nichols asked whether thornton was carrying a weapon
or drugs on his person or in his car.92 thornton denied
possessing either and agreed to the officer’s request to
perform a frisk search.93 During the search, nichols felt
a bulge in thornton’s left front pocket.94 nichols again
asked thornton if he was carrying any illegal drugs, and
this time thornton admitted that he was.95 nichols then
removed two separate bags from thornton’s pocket: one
contained a large amount of crack cocaine and the other
contained three smaller bags of marijuana.96 thornton
was handcuffed, placed under arrest, and put in the back
seat of the police car.97 only then did officer nichols
search thornton’s car, in which he found a gun under
the driver’s seat.98
thornton was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, possession
of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.99 thornton’s
motion to suppress the firearm and other evidence was
denied, and he was convicted of all three counts.100 on
appeal, the United states Court of appeals for the second Circuit rejected thornton’s argument that Belton
was limited to situations in which police first make contact with an arrestee while he is still in the car.101
in Belton, the officer made first contact with the
arrestee while he was still in his vehicle, ordered him to
get out of the car, and then placed him under arrest.102
thus, the fact that the arrest was made outside of the vehicle, as was the case in Thornton, did not preclude a
search of the car incident to that arrest. the Thornton
Court reasoned that the issue was not whether the arrest
Criminal Law Brief

was made outside of the car—that scenario was settled
by law.103 the issue was whether there is a constitutional distinction over whether first contact between the
officer and the suspect takes place after the suspect gets
out of the car on his own initiative or at the officer’s direction.104
the Court rightly and quickly dispensed with
this issue in favor of the government.105 it would be surprising for the Court to conclude that the legality of a
search depends on whether the arrestee exited his car by
choice or at the order of an officer, especially considering the search of an arrestee’s car is legal even if arrested
outside of the vehicle.
What is more significant about Thornton, for our
purposes, is the issue of thornton’s proximity to the car
and other circumstances at the time of his arrest and the
search of the car. the important issue is not why thornton got out of the car, but where he was at the time
nichols searched the car and whether the officer’s safety
or potential evidence was threatened by thornton after
being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the patrol car.
the circuit court correctly applied Belton below, and the
supreme Court did not directly address the question, assuming that this was not an issue. the Court interpreted
Thornton on the much more narrow, and more easily decided, issue of whether the place of first contact is constitutionally significant for the validity of the search.106
in Belton, the Court “placed no reliance” on the
fact that the officer had “ordered the occupants out of
the vehicle, or initiated contact with them while they remained within it.”107 the Thornton Court stated that it
did not “find such a factor persuasive in distinguishing
the current situation, as it bears no logical relationship
to Belton’s rationale.”108 Pointing to the rationale of Belton, the Court concluded that, in determining the area
within the arrestee’s immediate control, it makes no difference “whether the arrestee exited the vehicle at the
officer’s direction, or whether the officer initiated contact with him while he remained in the car.”109 the
Court then analyzed the issue as such: identical concerns
regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence
exist regardless of whether “the arrest [is of] a suspect
who is next to a vehicle . . . [or] of one who is inside the
vehicle.”110 While the Court posed the issue as whether
the officer ordered respondent out of the car or whether
he got out on his own, the Court based its analysis on
whether the arrest was made outside or inside the car.
such an approach moves the issue closer to the question
addressed in Gant.
the Thornton Court observed that the danger
9

sought to be addressed in Belton was “the fact of the ar- arrestee might reach, and explains that the Belton brightrest.”111 given an arrest, the likelihood of getting a line rule in automobile arrests is justified because the
weapon or destroying evidence is the same whether or passenger compartment is “generally, even if not innot the arrestee exited before the officer initiated contact evitably within the arrestee’s immediate control.”117
scalia notes that thornton was not in or near the
and is “outside of, but still in control of” the vehicle.112
the Constitution does not require officers to risk their car; instead, he was handcuffed and secured in the back
safety or the destruction of evidence by a “contact initi- of the police car at the time of the search.118 the risk
ation” rule.
that thornton could reach a weapon or evidence was
of course, the Belton requirement that the ar- “remote in the extreme” compared to the more dangerrestee be a “recent occupant” of the automobile would ous location of the arrestees in Belton. 119 “the Court’s
remain viable. Whether an arrestee is a “‘recent occu- effort to apply our current doctrine to this search
pant’ may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to stretches it beyond its breaking point,” wrote scalia.120
the concurrence identified and rejected three
the car at the time of the arrest and search,” the Court
113
explained. it then went on to imply that the temporal possible justifications for the Thornton search based on
and spatial factors that may determine whether someone the two Chimel rationales:
is a recent occupant need not ex1. the arrestee may escape and
a gun or evidence from the car.
ceed those of Belton, stating that
It is no longer accurate get
“not all contraband in the passenthis feat, scalia writes, would be
ger compartment is likely to be
to assume, as Belton consistent with Judge goldberg’s
readily accessible to a ‘recent oc“mythical arrestee ‘possessed of the
did,
that
the
arrestee
cupant,’” and “[i]t [was] unlikely
skill of houdini and the strength of
in this case that petitioner could
will generally, if not hercules.’”121
2. if the officer could have made
have reached under the driver’s
always,
have
access
to
the search at the time of the actual arseat for his gun once he was outrest near the car then he should be
side of his automobile.”114 the
the passenger comfirearm and passenger compartable to make it after he sensibly separtment
and
its
conment in general, however, were
cures the arrestee. scalia argues that
no more inaccessible than were
tainers for very long. the search is not an inevitable entithe contraband and the passenger
tlement but rather an exception to a
rule justified by the necessity of procompartment in Belton. the
need for a clear rule that would be readily understood tecting the officer and the evidence, the absence of
by officers and would not be dependent on differing es- which would otherwise make the search unlawful.122
3. although neither danger was present in this
timates of what items were within reach of an arrestee
at any particular moment justifies the sort of generaliza- case, Belton searches are reasonable under the fourth
tion that Belton enunciated. once officers determine amendment. it is better to have a bright-line rule even
that there is probable cause for an arrest, “it is reason- if some are not reasonable on their particular facts.123
as a practical matter, it is very common to have
able to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger the arrestee in handcuffs in the squad car precisely in
order to neutralize him as a threat to the officer or to evcompartment.”115
the thornton concurrence authored by Justice idence. scalia correctly noted that cases upholding such
scalia and joined by Justice ginsburg offers an alterna- searches are multitudinous and that courts have upheld
tive standard and gives some insight into why the Court searches where the arrestee is driven away from the
granted certiorari in the Gant case. the concurrence scene.124 today’s police training makes this type of
skips the issue the Court addresses regarding the when, search routine.125 it is no longer accurate to assume, as
where, and why of initial contact, and instead considers Belton did, that the arrestee will generally, if not always,
the circumstances at the time of the actual search. it be- have access to the passenger compartment and its congins with Chimel’s “immediate control” standard gov- tainers for very long. the concurring justices correctly
erning the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest concluded that this is no longer the case in light of police
to find weapons or evidence.116 Thornton notes the ra- adaptation to the Belton rule.
tionale as the need for covering that area into which an
however, Belton may be justifiable, writes
10
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scalia, simply because the car may contain evidence of
the crime for which the person was arrested.126 scalia’s
concurrence intimates that it is reasonable to search for
evidence of a crime when and where the person is arrested for that crime. But the narrower Chimel rule, he
notes, also has historical support.127 therefore, either
the Rabinowitz or Chimel rules represent plausible
means of analysis. indicating his discomfort with Belton, scalia writes that its historical support is based only
on stare decisis.128 scalia further writes that Belton cannot be explained as an application of Chimel.129 rather,
it is a return to broader pre-Chimel authority limited to
automobiles because of a reduced expectation of privacy
and heightened law enforcement needs. returning to
this “evidence of the crime” standard would help reconcile Robinson (police may search the person incident to
arrest without regard to presence or absence of either
Chimel rationale because the fact of the arrest alone is
enough justification) and Rabinowitz (the arrest itself is
not enough to justify the search but the search is justified
based on a reasonable belief that evidence would be
found).130
scalia concludes by offering a new standard
based on, but limiting, Belton: “[we] would therefore
limit Belton searches to cases where it is reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be
found in the vehicle.”131 Pursuant to an arrest for a drug
offense it is entirely reasonable to believe that the car
from which the arrestee emerged and was still close to
could contain further contraband or other similar related
evidence. this standard still leaves a number of questions unanswered and would require additional and extensive fact-finding hearings by the trial court as it
considers the issue on a case-by-case basis.132
Justice stevens’ dissent, to which Justice souter
joined, emphasizes the fact that first contact occurred
when thornton was out of the car. thornton was essentially an “arrested pedestrian.”133 the dissent argues that
Chimel alone is enough to govern this situation because
it is no longer an automobile arrest. the same protections should apply to a recent occupant of a vehicle as
to a recent occupant of a house. the majority, stevens
writes, “[e]xtends Belton’s reach without providing any
guidance for the future application of its swollen
rule.”134
the opinions in Thornton reveal uneasiness with
Belton by at least five justices: scalia, ginsburg,
stevens, souter and o’Connor. in light of this, one can
ask why the Court did not address the Belton issue in its
2004 Thornton opinion. like gant, thornton was in
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handcuffs in the rear of the patrol car at the time of the
search. Perhaps buyer’s remorse after Thornton helps
explain why the Court decided to grant certiorari in
Gant.
ARizonA v. GAnt: The CaSe BelOW135
During the daylight hours of august 25, 1999,
two uniformed officers of the tucson police department
knocked on the door of a house in response to a tip that
activities involving illegal narcotics were taking place
inside.136 rodney gant answered the door.137 the police
officers asked to speak to the owner of the residence,
and gant responded by telling them that the owner was
away and would return later in the afternoon.138 Before
returning that evening, the officers learned that there
was an outstanding warrant for gant’s arrest for driving
with a suspended license.139 While the officers were in
the process of making arrests outside the front of the residence, gant drove up and parked his car in the driveway.140 as gant got out of the car, an officer
immediately called him over, intending to place him
under arrest based on the outstanding warrant.141 gant
walked eight to twelve feet from the car toward the officer, and an officer handcuffed him and placed him
under arrest.142 Within moments, gant was seated in the
back seat of the patrol car under the supervision of an
officer.143 two other officers, pursuant to their training
in the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful
automobile arrest, searched the passenger compartment
of the car that gant had been driving just moments before.144 in the course of that search, the officers found a
small plastic bag of cocaine and a pistol.145 Contemporaneously, two others had also been arrested and
placed in the back seats of two other police vehicles.146
in all, four officers were present at the scene, which was
considered secure.147
the procedural history of the case is less simple.
Based on the bag of drugs, gant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia.148 the trial court denied gant’s motion
to suppress both the drugs and the bag.149 Consequently,
gant was convicted of both counts.150 on appeal, the
arizona Court of appeals reversed the denial of gant’s
motion to suppress.151 the arizona supreme Court denied review but the United states supreme Court
granted the state’s petition for certiorari.152 the
supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of appeals and remanded for reconsideration in light of a relevant case that had been decided by the arizona
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supreme Court in the interim.153 that interim case, State
v. Dean,154 held that if an arrestee is not a recent occupant of the car from which he is arrested then Belton
does not apply.155 the Court of appeals remanded
gant’s case to the trial court for determination of
whether gant was a “recent occupant” under state and
federal law. the trial court found that gant was, in fact,
a recent occupant and again upheld the search and admission of the evidence.156 gant again appealed to the
arizona Court of appeals, which again reversed on
grounds that the search was not “contemporaneous”
with gant’s arrest and that the two rationales were not
present for the automobile search incident to a lawful
arrest exception to the warrant requirement of Chimel.157
the state appealed to the arizona supreme Court,
which affirmed,158 and the United states supreme Court
granted the state’s second petition for certiorari.159
the arizona supreme Court posed the issue in
Gant as follows: does the search incident to arrest exception permit the warrantless search of an arrestee’s car
“when the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed,
seated in the back of a patrol car, and under the supervision of a police officer”?160 the court held that under
such circumstances such a search is not justified.161 By
framing the issue as it did, the arizona supreme Court
distinguished Belton on its facts. more difficult was distinguishing Thornton, the facts of which are essentially
identical to those in Gant. the arizona supreme Court
unpersuasively argued that the only issue the petitioners
raised in Thornton was the significance of when first
contact occurs and that the Thornton Court could not
and did not reach the issue presented in Gant.
Before the arizona supreme Court, the state argued gant’s case was an easy one because Belton and
Thornton were controlling.162 But unlike Belton, the
court held that this case did not deal with the permissible
scope of a search of an automobile incident to a contemporaneous arrest of a recent occupant but “with the
threshold question whether the police may conduct a
search incident to arrest at all when the scene is secure.”163 “Because Belton does not purport to answer
this question,” the arizona supreme Court claimed, “we
must determine whether officer safety or the preservation of evidence, the rationales that excuse the warrant
requirement for searches incident to arrest, justified the
warrantless search of gant’s car.”164
the arizona supreme Court read the record as
showing that the scene was completely secure.165 there
was no reason to think anyone had access to the passenger compartment or that the safety of the officers or any
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evidence was at risk. the arizona supreme Court held
that “absent either of these Chimel rationales, the search
cannot be upheld as a lawful search incident to arrest.”166
the arizona supreme Court claimed that Gant
did not require it to “reconsider Belton” because the
facts were very different.167 it made no effort, therefore,
to offer arguments for abandoning the rule of stare decisis. in Belton, the court emphasized that there was one
officer and four unsecured suspects outside the car168
thereby putting the safety of the officer and the integrity
of the evidence at risk. therefore, the Chimel reasons
for a search of the passenger compartment incident to
arrest were at hand in Belton, unlike in Gant.169 the
court read Belton as first requiring, as a threshold issue,
the determination of one or both Chimel conditions to
justify a search at all and then, if one condition applies,
imposing a bright-line rule solely on the scope of the
search.170
the state used the Belton rationale to argue that
because the passenger compartment is usually within
reach of an arrestee, it is unnecessary to analyze the exigency in each case. the court incorrectly held, however, that at least one exigency is necessary or it would
be permissible to search the car an hour later, a result
that was rejected in Chimel. the state further argued
that under Robinson, the Chimel justifications are presumed to exist by virtue of the arrest itself and that the
prosecution need not show actual danger in order to
search a car.171
the arizona supreme Court rejected these arguments. it wrote that Robinson instead teaches that police
can perform a search incident to arrest without proving
in any particular case that they were concerned about
safety or evidence because it is presumed present in
every arrest.172 But if those concerns “are no longer
present,” then the justifications are absent and a warrant
is required.173 according to the arizona supreme Court,
potential danger to safety and evidence is a presumption
that can be rebutted by the defense, even if it is a search
of arrestee’s person not involving a vehicle. the burden
is then shifted to the government to prove that either a
threat to the officer’s safety or to the integrity potential
evidence was indeed present in order to take advantage
of the Belton warrant exception.174
the arizona supreme Court recognized that
most other courts have found Belton and Thornton dispositive on similar facts,175 but the court did not read
them as abandoning the Chimel justifications for warrantless searches incident to lawful arrests in automobiles. the majority acknowledged the need for clear,
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understandable rules in this area and noted the opposi- arrest. it explained that the court was wrong because
tion of arizona law enforcement to any changes in Bel- the validity of a Belton search does not depend on the
ton search procedures.176 the majority, however, presence of Chimel rationales in a particular case.184 the
rejected the warnings that law enforcement will “game” new york state Court of appeals in Belton made the
the rules and will not secure the arrestee until the search same mistake and the supreme Court corrected that
is done, and thus risk putting themselves in jeopardy.177 error.185 Brennan’s dissent in Belton showed that he
no other theories were advanced or relied upon, such as knew exactly what the majority was doing.186 Brennan
the automobile or impoundment exceptions, to justify observed that “[t]he Court today substantially expands
the warrantless search.
the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arthe en banc opinion of the arizona supreme rest by permitting police officers to search areas and
Court in Gant was decided by a 3-2 vote. Justice W. containers the arrestee could not possibly reach at the
scott Bales authored the dissenting opinion and con- time of arrest.”187
cluded that the majority’s reasoning was inconsistent
the majority in Gant took issue with the Belton
with Belton. there are “good reasons to reconsider Bel- majority in the same way Brennan did in his dissent.
ton,” he wrote, but “doing so is the sole prerogative of Brennan unsuccessfully argued that “[w]hen the arrest
the United states supreme Court.”178 the dissent re- has been consummated and the arrestee safely taken into
custody, the justifications underlying
jected the majority’s claim that BelChimel’s limited exception to the
ton and Thornton do not control.179 it
did not read Belton as requiring a In Belton, the search warrant requirement cease to apply:
threshold finding of one of the
at that point there is no possibility
did
not
take
place
that the arrestee could reach weapons
Chimel factors to justify a Belton
search.
until the officer had or contraband.”188 Based on Brenthe dissent persuasively surnan’s dissent in Belton, it is hard to
already
removed
veyed the arguments against the maunderstand how the Gant majority
jority’s conclusions. according to
the defendant from could adopt an interpretation that the
the dissent, Belton was an extension
Belton majority specifically rejected.
the
car.
The
Belton
in his dissent in the arizona
of Chimel and Robinson. in Robinson, searches of a person incident to
supreme
Court, Bales wrote that
Court did not then
arrest are permissible regardless of
“Belton is also inconsistent with the
look to see if either majority’s focus on the Chimel ratiowhether, in a particular case, “there
189
was present one of the reasons supof the Chimel ratio- nales at the time of the search.” in
porting the [exception to the warrant
Belton, the search did not take place
nales were present. until the officer had already removed
requirement].”180 the lawful arrest
the defendant from the car.190 the
itself justifies the search. “[t]he authority to search the person incident
Belton Court did not then look to see
to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need if either of the Chimel rationales was present at that
to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on point. it stated that the search was justified by the arrest
what a court may later decide was the probability in a itself. the Court in Belton held that the arrest was jusparticular arrest situation that weapons or evidence tified because of circumstances thought generally to
would . . . be found.”181
exist during the arrest of a recent occupant, not on any
the dissent writes that the supreme Court de- particularized concerns for safety or evidence. even the
fined the area of immediate control with the generaliza- jacket in the passenger compartment was ruled to be
tion that the passenger compartment and any containers within Belton’s “immediate control” for the purpose of
therein may be searched contemporaneously to the ar- a search incident to arrest.191
Justice Brennan recognized that under the ruling
rest of a recent automobile occupant.182 it was therefore
permissible to search containers, including containers in Belton, “the result would presumably be the same
that could not hold weapons or evidence of the crime even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his comfor which the arrest was made.183
panions in the patrol car before placing them under araccording to the dissent, the majority erred in rest.”192 nearly every appellate court that has since
holding that the search was not incident to gant’s lawful considered the issue has confirmed Brennan’s point.193
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this does not, as the majority claims, mean that
police officers may conduct warrantless searches hours
and miles removed from the arrest. Belton makes clear,
and the Gant majority does not disagree, that the car
searched must be that of a “recent occupant” and come
“as a contemporaneous incident” of the arrest.194 the
arrestee need not be in the car nor must the search be simultaneous to the arrest as long as there is some temporal proximity.195
Bales recognized that the arizona supreme
Court majority created a new test that ignored Belton’s
determination that searches in this context should be
guided by a “straightforward rule” that does not depend
on case-by-case adjudications. the arizona supreme
Court majority says that a Belton search is not justified
unless, “based on the totality of the circumstances,”
there is a reasonable risk to the officer’s safety or preservation of evidence.196 such an inquiry can only be made
on a case-by-case basis, first by police officers and then
by the trial and reviewing courts.197 this practical result
is at odds with the core motivation of Belton: to develop
a clear rule not dependent on differing estimates of what
items were and were not within reach of an arrestee at
any particular moment.198 this imperative justifies the
sort of generalization which Belton enunciated.
Belton already requires some case-by-case
analysis of the totality of the circumstances itself
through the twin requirements that the arrestee is a recent occupant and that the search is contemporaneous
with the arrest.199 these are threshold requirements that
trigger the right to conduct a Belton search of a car, the
scope of which is the passenger compartment and any
containers. these determinations certainly do not mean
that there must be case-specific findings of exigent circumstances at the time of the search. in fact, it suggests
the contrary.
Justice Bales did add that the Belton bright-line
rule “has long been criticized and probably merits reconsideration.”200 the bright-line rule, he wrote, created
“a significant exception to the fourth amendment’s
warrant requirement by making a generalization about
the exigencies of arrests involving automobiles and then
allowing searches whether or not the concerns justifying
the exception were present in any particular case.”201
Bales criticizes Belton as resting on a “shaky foundation” that has gotten more tenuous over time because
police now routinely arrest and handcuff arrestees before conducting Belton searches.202
there are, however, alternative ways of dealing
with Belton’s weaknesses other than the majority’s
14

method. one such alternative, Bales suggested, would
have been for the arizona supreme Court to ground its
holding in the arizona state constitution rather than the
United states Constitution, as some other state courts
have done.203
as will be discussed below, the certiorari petition and the oral argument revealed that the Court was
interested in reassessing the twenty-eight-year-old holding in Belton, as well as the four-year-old holding in
Thornton. that subsequent interest still does not explain, however, the arizona supreme Court’s disregard
of the established precedent in Belton and Thornton.
the arizona court’s reinterpretation of the Belton doctrine was too clever by half and unjustified wishful
thinking. it did not distinguish, in any meaningful way,
the facts in Gant from Belton and especially from
Thornton. in the case of Thornton, it tried to distinguish
on the issue instead. in the case of Belton, the arizona
court chose to challenge its bright-line rule by arguing
that the placement of the line may be logically inconsistent with the reason for the search in the first place. the
court’s decision represented a blow to the authority of
the supreme Court of the United states in determining
the meaning of the Constitution of the United states.
the arizona supreme Court could have based its holding on the arizona state constitution and had its way on
the streets of that state. the court chose, however, to
flaunt its rejection of Belton and throw a gauntlet before
the U.s. supreme Court. the supreme Court’s subsequent willingness to revisit Belton is no excuse for the
arizona supreme Court’s judicial insubordination. it
should have applied the law and let gant seek certiorari
in the supreme Court.
The uniTeD STaTeS SuPreMe
COurT COnSiDerS GAnt204
in its petition for a writ of certiorari, the state
of arizona argued, rightly in our view, that the arizona
supreme Court’s opinion in Gant not only conflicted
with, but actually sought to overrule Belton and Thornton. By substituting a “factual assessment in every case
[of] whether the justifications underlying the search incident to arrest actually exist,”205 the Gant court “contradicts and effectively ‘overrules’” Belton206 and
“directly contradicts [its] language and spirit.”207 the
supreme Court rejected this case-by-case analysis in
Belton, a rejection reaffirmed in Thornton under nearly
identical facts.208 arizona asked the supreme Court to
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take the case because the ruling “conflicts with the holdings of nearly every state and federal court that has applied Belton and Thornton to factual situations like
gant’s.”209 it repeatedly argues that the Gant “case-specific assessment of actual risks to officers and evidence”
is “unworkable for the very reasons that [the supreme]
Court has repeatedly cited in support of a bright-line
rule.”210 the Gant decision “thwarts” the Court’s efforts
to impose a “straightforward rule, easily applied, and
predictably enforced.”211
in opposition to arizona’s request to hear the
case, respondent gant took a slightly different tack than
did the arizona supreme Court. gant’s pleading relied
more heavily on the claim that the search of his car was
not a “contemporaneous incident” of the arrest as required in Belton.212 By framing the issue as whether a
Belton requirement of “contemporaneousness” was met,
gant gave the Court the opportunity to decide the case
without challenging Belton directly. gant agreed with
the arizona supreme Court, however, that the opinion
did not overrule or even contradict Belton and Thornton
and that it was “consistent with the constitutional principles affirmed in Chimel v. California.”213 the pleading
accused arizona of “abandon[ing] fourth amendment
protections by misapplying Chimel and Belton,”214 describing its interpretation as “fundamentally flawed.”215
he quoted Justice o’Connor’s concurrence in Thornton,
saying that exigent circumstances attendant at arrests of
recent automobile occupants “[did] not create an absolute and continuing right of law enforcement to conduct a search of the vehicle.”216
gant supported the arizona supreme Court’s
reasoning that a finding of at least one of the two Chimel
rationales was a prerequisite for searching the car at all
and that the Belton bright-line rule applied only to the
scope of the subsequent search. Under gant’s interpretation of the Belton rule, there was no threat to the safety
of the officers or the integrity of evidence in the vehicle.217
there are two possible reasons why the supreme
Court granted certiorari in the Gant case. one is that
the Court planned to reaffirm the rulings in Belton and
Thornton and noticeably correct the arizona supreme
Court for its novel and unprecedented misapplication of
Belton. the Court may have thought it necessary to
send a message, both to the arizona supreme Court and
other courts around the country that have strayed from
its teaching, and to remind them that the bright-line rule
imposed by Belton remained the law of the land. there
have been few cases other than Gant, however, in which
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federal circuit courts or state courts of last resort have
rejected or strayed from Belton.218
another possible reason is that the Court was
willing to reconsider, or at least reexamine, its holding
in Belton, even after refusing to take such an opportunity
just four years prior when it was arguably presented in
Thornton. in light of each justice’s previously expressed
views on Belton and the concerns expressed in the oral
arguments, it was clear that there was a genuine discomfort with Belton. But while a desire to reconsider its
bright-line rule may have motivated its decision to grant
certiorari in Gant, none of the factors that are usually
present when the supreme Court grants certiorari to reconsider a well-established case were present in Gant.
there was no major split among courts considering the
issue, there had been substantial reliance on Belton, Belton had not been ignored or proven unworkable, and
there had been no subsequent supreme Court cases undermining Belton.
in its brief on the merits, petitioner arizona reiterated that Belton does not require a fact-bound assessment of either of the Chimel rationales. it went on to
argue that “searches conducted under Belton’s brightline rule are reasonable” and that such a limited search
“correctly balances the need for officer safety and evidence preservation with an arrestee’s limited privacy interest in his automobile.”219 arizona added the fanciful
argument, however, that there is in fact a reasonable
danger that gant could have escaped from the police car
and posed a threat to the officers or the evidence.220 arizona’s brief went on to argue that Belton already answered the question presented in Gant, that Thornton
recently reaffirmed this answer, and that principles of
stare decisis favored affirming it once again.221 the established rule should be affirmed because it has proven
to be “workable,” it “protects fourth amendment interests” and there is “no special justification . . . to overrule
it.”222 further, abandoning the Belton rule would pose
a “special hardship” for police officers and departments
which would be forced to develop and retrain new procedures in order to account for the ramifications of the
Gant opinion.223
gant’s brief again argued that the arizona
supreme Court did not contradict Belton or Thornton
and asserted that “all searches incident to arrest must
rest on Chimel’s twin exigency rationales” under those
cases.224 such searches include those of the arrestee’s
person as well as the area that is reasonable within reach.
the bright-line rules of Belton and Thornton delineate
the scope of the permissible search. Police may search
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the entire passenger compartment of an automobile
nevertheless, if the justices stayed true to their
“when any part of the car is arguably within the imme- voting records in the previous related cases there apdiate control of its recent occupant.”225 in this case no peared to be a majority for reversal of the arizona
such argument can be made, gant concludes. he points supreme Court in Gant. Based on their history, Justices
out factual determinations are still required in order to Kennedy, Breyer, and thomas should have supported
determine whether the arrestee is a “recent occupant” arizona’s view of the permissibility of the search on
and whether the search is a “contemporaneous incident” stare decisis grounds, if nothing else.235 the two newest
of the arrest.226 he argues in the alternative that if the justices, Chief Justice roberts and Justice alito, had not
arizona supreme Court opinion amounted to a contra- had occasion to address the issue before Gant, but were
diction of Belton and Thornton, the Court should indeed expected to align themselves in the majority on the basis
reconsider the holdings in those cases.227 gant therefore of stare decisis.236
concluded by pointing out that searches of automobiles
Kennedy and Breyer’s questions and statements,
pursuant to arrest of a recent occupant are not per se rea- however, showed a willingness to revisit Belton’s brightline rule and its underlying rationales.237 two more jussonable.228
the oral arguments on october 7, 2008, were tices, scalia and ginsburg, were expected to concur in
lively, with many justices who were critical of Belton a judgment to reverse, but on more narrow grounds than
showing some degree of willingness to reconsider it. the government argued.238 thus, there were the seeds
reworking the relationship between
the justices peppered the three attorneys (the United states appeared as
Chimel and Belton and an announceKennedy and
ment of a new rationale for allowing
an amicus) with questions. neverBreyer’s questions Belton-style searches. there were two
theless, the government counsel
solid votes, Justice stevens and Justice
poorly handled the oral arguments.
and statements,
first, arizona and the United states
souter, for the proposition that Belton
however,
showed
a
requires, as a preliminary matter, a findwere not adequately prepared to
argue the reasonableness of the Bel- willingness to revist ing of danger to the officer or the evidence in order to conduct a search of the
ton approach under the fourth
Belton’s
bright-line
car and its containers once the arrestee
amendment’s
reasonableness
Clause. Justice scalia wanted infor- rule and its underly- is outside the car.239
the oral arguments provide furmation on the historic reasonableness
ing rationales.
ther clues to the thinking of each justice.
of the practice and neither attorney
although Chief Justice roberts was not
was prepared to provide any.229 second, the two governments also wasted a lot of time and on the Court for any of the previous relevant cases, he,
credibility on the notion that the Chimel rationales con- nevertheless, indicated his fealty to the Belton precedent
tinue to apply even when arrestees are in cuffs in the po- through his questions. he stated that the purpose of a
lice car.230 they emphasized statistics showing that bright-line rule was that “you don’t have to justify it in
suspects occasionally escape from the back of squad every particular case” and pointed out that by asking for
cars despite being handcuffed and could, therefore, ac- a case-by-case inquiry, appellees “[a]re … giving up the
tually pose a danger to the officers or evidence.231 not bright-line rule.” 240 “you don’t look at the specific
only did this waste valuable argument time, but it was facts” in such cases, he argued, that’s “[t]he whole point
also inconsistent with the crux of their argument.232 the of a bright line rule.”241 he went on to explore the ramCourt was surprised by this strategy and did not buy the ifications of eliminating the bright-line rule, posing hyargument.233 lastly, the government argued for the ap- pothetical fact situations. he asked, “[w]hat if [the
plication of Belton and Thornton when it should have arrestee] is in the back of the car but not handcuffed?”242
been putting the burden on gant to justify the arizona roberts continued by stating that “you have exactly the
court’s rejection of those precedents. in doing so, the same case-by-case inquiry that Belton said we are not
government failed to emphasize the importance of sup- going to do . . . . [i]n Thornton of course [the arrestee]
porting Belton based on the doctrine of stare decisis. it was handcuffed in the back of the police car . . . . What
could not provide the Court with the correct standard of is left of the Belton bright-line rule when you are done
special circumstances required to overturn established . . . .”243 then roberts noted that gant’s argument
precedent.234
“[a]ssum[ed Belton] was wrong . . .” and that gant was
16
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essentially arguing to overrule Belton’s bright-line rule
when he said “in these circumstances Belton applies,
and in these circumstances, it doesn’t.”244
Justice samuel alito was also new to the issue.
his questioning focused on two themes: stare decisis
and the difficulty of adopting a case-by-case approach.
assuming you have to overrule Belton, he asked gant,
“don’t you have to show that there are special circumstances justifying the overruling of Belton” such as that
it has been proven unworkable, that it has been undermined by subsequent cases, that lower courts have not
relied upon it, or others?245 alito offered a few hypotheticals involving the requirements of “recent occupancy” of the car and “contemporaneousness” of the
arrest to show that a case-by-case analysis could prove
problematic.246
after exploring ways to abandon the Belton rule,
while still permitting the search of the automobile on
other grounds, through impoundment, the plain view
doctrine, or pursuant to a warrant, Justice Breyer declared that he found the case “very, very difficult.”247
he was skeptical of the notion that overruling Belton
would prompt the police to intentionally place themselves in danger in order to have the authority to search.
he hinted that he would vote to uphold Belton on stare
decisis grounds in the absence of any compelling reason
to overturn it.248 Belton is not very logical, he said, but
it has been the law for almost thirty years and in the absence of a “disaster” or a “reason it is wrong” he would
not overrule an earlier case.249
Justice anthony Kennedy, as is often his practice, seemed to be looking for the middle ground. his
questioning implied that he agreed with gant, that the
Belton bright-line rule requires the support of one of the
Chimel rationales. he seemed at times to assume that
there was no bright-line rule as of yet and that petitioners were asking for one.250 yet he was unpersuaded by
arizona’s argument that there was still a danger to the
officers and a risk of destruction of evidence despite the
arrestee being handcuffed in the police car.251 he admitted frustration that arizona relied so heavily on this
argument.252 he struggled for an alternative rationale
that he could use to justify a bright-line rule and pointed
towards the car’s mobility, that cars can be stolen or
taken for joy rides, that there may be contraband or
weapons in the car and that other people could get to
them.253
no justice placed more significance on the original intent of the framers than Justice scalia. Justice
scalia was the most active member of the Court during
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the oral arguments in Gant.254 Justice scalia had already
shown his discomfort with the Belton bright-line in his
concurrence in Thornton, in which he argued the rule in
Rabinowitz should apply to Belton searches. Justice
scalia was disappointed that none of the litigants was
able to provide him with anything to “hang [his] hat on,”
by way of evidence that the framers, or any court since
that time, had found the searches allowed under Belton
to be reasonable under the fourth amendment. 255 the
government argued that police had come to rely on Belton over the nearly three decades since it was decided.256
But scalia was more interested in a longer time frame,
going back to the framers themselves. Using the example of thomas Jefferson’s carriage, he wondered
whether the framers would have considered the Belton
rule to be reasonable under the fourth amendment.257
if so, he asserted, that would be decisive for him in the
Gant case. the litigants were unable to answer the
question of the framers’ original intent in drafting the
fourth amendment as it would relate to the reasonableness of Belton searches.258
if it is not a reasonable rule, scalia said, then
“it’s just silly. it’s . . . simply not the case . . . . i am
going to say, you know, get rid of it.”259 scalia observed
that, realistically, the officer is not at risk if the arrestee
is handcuffed in the police cruiser and the officer
searches his car.260 “[W]hat risk to the officer is being
avoided?”261 he further noted that if you remove the requirement to show a threat to officer safety, “why would
you limit the search just to the passenger compartment
of the vehicle? Why don’t you let him search the trunk,
too?”262 it is illogical to “abandon the safety requirement” and then draw the line so that police cannot
search the whole car.263
scalia again emphasized that the scope of any
search should be limited to evidence of the crime for
which the suspect is being arrested.264 if the arrest is for
speeding, he wondered, what do the police think they
will find by searching the car?265 But, of course, many
traffic arrests initially show no signs of other crimes
until searches of the person and automobile take place.
scalia’s idea to link the arrest with the search for
evidence that would support that arrest was laid out in
his concurrence in Thornton, but neither attorney for the
government seemed prepared to address scalia’s concurrence. the government should have prepared its
standard as an alternative to its main argument.
scalia foresaw that more widespread impoundment would constitute a threat to his standard and
would, as a practical matter, be the police reaction to an
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abandonment of the Belton rule.266 But he questioned if
impoundment could always be authorized.267 Why,
asked scalia, must searches of vehicles, but not searches
of the person, be tied to the two reasons?268 Police can
search mother teresa if they arrest her, even though
there is little chance that she is carrying weapons.269
even if it is obvious that there is little to no chance of
hostility in a given situation, there are still bright-line
rules that govern the searches of persons.270 Why not
have a similar rule regarding autos as well?271
Justice ginsburg joined scalia’s Thornton concurrence, approving of searches for evidence of the
crime for which the suspect is being arrested. Belton,
she observed, was concerned with weapons and “grab
areas.”272 also, she inquired about impoundment and
subsequent inventory searches.273 she relied on Chambers to draw the line at warrantless station-house impoundment searches as unreasonable and asked whether
the facts in Gant were analogous to that situation.274
“[W]hat happens to the car?” she asked.275 Under what
circumstances could the police impound and search the
car? here the car was on a private driveway.276 Could
police still have impounded and done an inventory
search?277 she astutely took issue with the arizona
supreme Court’s reasoning that it was not overruling
Belton, but merely putting the bright-line rule in context.278 following such reasoning would lead to no
bright-line rules.
Justice stevens, as mentioned above, concurred
in Belton but dissented in Thornton. During oral arguments, he seemed to argue that the traditional automobile exception to the warrant requirement could control
these cases.279 Under the exception, police are entitled
to search an automobile when they have probable cause
to believe it contains contraband, along with any containers reasonably expected to contain such evidence.280
Why should other cases allow for more extensive
searches on less than probable cause?
he reminded the litigants that in Belton, the suspects were not under the sort of control that they were
in Thornton and in Gant.281 therefore, he reasoned, arizona and the United states were actually asking for
more than the Court gave in Belton—an “expanded Belton.”282 there is very little danger to the officers here;
police just “want the ability to search the vehicle.”283
stevens hinted that he would not be inclined to
join the scalia-ginsburg analysis allowing searches for
evidence of the crime in question. taking issue with the
scalia-ginsburg rationale, he said the scalia-ginsburg
analysis should only control when there is probable
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cause to believe there is some evidence in the vehicle.284
Justice souter joined Justice stevens by dissenting in Thornton. like Justice stevens, Justice souter
was a solid vote for gant. he was sympathetic to gant’s
view of Belton as being linked to the Chimel rule of an
area within the suspect’s “immediate control” and at
least one of its rationales. the government’s view,
souter stated, divorces the search completely from the
Chimel rule and concluded that Belton’s bright-line is
dependent upon the presence of one of the two underlying rationales.285 so either we declare it is no longer a
Chimel rule or if we say it applies in a case like this, it
is “nonsense.”286 the choice, he said, was between applying a new and different rule or applying Chimel.287
responding to the government’s main argument
about the continued existence of the Chimel factors,
souter asked whether in escape cases an officer was ever
injured.288 Did the arrestee “make a beeline — for his
own car?”289 are there any examples “where the arrestee went back to his own car and tried to get a gun to
hurt a police officer?”290 Was the arrestee handcuffed?291
Could he still drive the car?292 souter assumed that no
search of the car is permissible on an incident to arrest
theory if the arrestee is in the station house.293 “Why
isn’t it equally workable to say when the [arrestee] is
handcuffed and put in the back of a cruiser, they can’t
do it?” 294
POSSiBle hOlDinGS295
in our view, the U.s. supreme Court had five
possible options for its holding in Gant:
1. Stare Decisis: reaffirm Belton’s result and
rationale.
the Court could have maintained the bright-line
rule that the police may search the entire passenger
compartment of an automobile, including the glove
compartment, as well as any container therein, contemporaneous to an arrest of a recent occupant of that vehicle. the trick would be how to reconcile the ruling with
the obsolete Belton rationale that arrestees will, more
often than not, have access to the compartment and thus
endanger the safety of the officer and integrity of evidence. instead, the importance of a bright-line rule and
the maintenance of a widely used and easily applied
standard must be emphasized.
the Court could have instructed the arizona
supreme Court and other lower courts that the brightWinter 2009

another approach could have been to develop a
line rule of Belton, as would be reaffirmed in Gant, does
not require specific factual findings of either actual risk new standard based on the twin factors in Chimel. for
that the police officer(s) may be in danger of harm or example, the police may search the interior passenger
destruction or alteration of evidence as a threshold issue compartment of an automobile, and any containers
to conducting a search of the automobile. the bright therein, up until the moment that all recent occupants
line is drawn by virtue of the arrest itself, defining the of an automobile are safely in custody and the automoscope of the permissible search as including the passen- bile is secured.
in other words, it could be lawful to search the
ger compartment and any containers within it. such a
search is subject only to the limitations that the arrest interior compartment of an automobile and any containmust be of “recent occupants” of the car and “contem- ers therein, without a warrant, if the government can
poraneous” to the search as defined by the applicable show that one or more recent occupants or other persons
posed an actual danger to the officers’ safety or to the
body of case law.
this option would have constituted no change integrity of any evidence. evidence that the suspects
in the way practitioners have dealt with these issues. were safely under arrest or within the control of the pothe ability to search and the scope thereof would re- lice, or that no one else had access to the car would unmain the same, as would the possibility of litigation re- dermine any ability to establish such dangers.
rebuttable presumptions could
garding the recent occupancy of the
be imposed against either the
vehicle and the contemporaneity of
The
trick
would
be
how
defense or the government.
the search.
this
standard
to reconcile the ruling
would address the issue in
2. redraw and redefine the Bright
with
the
obsolete
Belton
line.
Gant and accord with the unUnder this approach the
rationale that arrestees derlying rationale that there is
a special danger of harm
Court would have specified the prewill, more often than
and/or destruction of evidence
cise facts that would constitute the
location of the line determining
not, have access to the from occupants of automobiles. this, of course, would
whether police can conduct a search.
compartment and thus have required additional litigaone example is in the facts of Gant
itself: when the suspect is in handendanger the safety of tion and fact-finding on the
difficult issue of what circumcuffs and in the patrol car. the line
could be re-drawn in any number of the officer and integrity stances present a danger to the
officer or evidence. it is possiother places and ways, considering
of evidence.
ble, but unlikely, that police
factors such as: when the suspects
would purposely manage the
are under arrest, when they are in
the squad car, when they are handcuffed, or when they arrest scene to maintain threats to themselves or the evare removed from the car. the number of police officers idence in order to justify a search of the car.
Certain basic fact situations would present, howpresent must also affect the rules.
the Court could have avoided overruling Belton ever, some compelling conclusions that may require a
by finding that police procedures developed in response bright-line rule nonetheless. Would courts find, for exto Belton undermined the Court’s assumptions of the ample, that the existence of just one police officer crecircumstances of these searches and now require fine- ates a per se danger unless the arrestee or arrestees are
handcuffed and secured in a police cruiser? in such a
tuning of the placement of the line.
this option likely would have created the awk- situation, an arrestee might run or attack the officer even
ward situation of lines being drawn in different places if handcuffed. With this option, police may respond by
under different circumstances. it would have changed developing procedures such that after the arrestee and
how practitioners litigate the issues by requiring a find- the car are secured, they may search the car either
ing of whether any of the new factors permitting a through impoundment or pursuant to a search warrant.
it would be hard to imagine how the Court could
search were present in a given case.
have adopted this approach without overruling Belton
by finding the special circumstances usually required
3. a Chimel-based standard.
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by a departure from stare decisis. this approach could
also serve to undermine the “search incident to arrest of
a person” doctrine under Robinson and perhaps require
or lead to its modification as well. rather than always
allowing a full search of the person contemporaneous
to an arrest, a new rule in Gant could presuppose that
such searches require a showing that the suspect posed
an actual risk of harm to the officer or destruction of evidence. in most cases, the warrantless search incident
to a lawful arrest would be upheld but not before additional litigation of the facts of each arrest.
4. evidence of the Crime.
another possible approach is to adopt the novel
scalia-ginsburg approach that a car search for evidence
of the crime for which the arrest is being made would
be reasonable under the fourth amendment. this
would open a whole new area of litigation, fact-finding,
and appellate case law as courts struggled with how to
define the permissible scope of such searches. some of
the questions and issues the courts will face include: for
what crimes is the suspect arrested? What happens
when multiple suspects are arrested for different offenses? What sort of evidence is relevant to what sorts
of crimes, for example: is a gun evidence of the crime
of drug possession and vice versa? is marijuana evidence of driving under the influence? if the arrest is for
a weapons offense, what is relevant evidence? Would
any search ever be permissible pursuant to arrests for
traffic offenses? if not, would that not potentially put
officers in danger of weapons in the car, for example?
Could more complete searches still be conducted if either of the Chimel rationales were present? Where in
the car can be searched? is the scope governed by the
likelihood of relevant evidence being found? What
about containers?
5. other means to the end: Warrants Based Upon Pro
bable Cause or other exceptions
the final alternative would be to abolish any exception to the warrant clause beyond that involving the
immediate area of control as determined by a Chimel
analysis, and treat recent occupants of cars no differently than pedestrians or recent occupants of homes.
thus, in order to search the passenger compartment and
any containers therein, the police would need to obtain
a warrant based on probable cause as argued by stevens
and souter. Police could also attempt to justify a search
under some other exception to the warrant requirement.
impoundment would become a regular tactic utilized by
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the police and one that would, ironically, constitute a
greater intrusion upon the owner and driver of the car
than would a search at the scene.
it is well established that the Court is free to do
as it pleases, as long as it has five votes. given the options above and what occurred during the oral arguments, the Court could have found support for several
outcomes. Chief Justice roberts, along with Justices
alito, thomas, and perhaps Breyer, could have found
support for option number one, ruling that stare decisis
reverses the arizona supreme Court decision. also,
there could have been two votes—Justices stevens and
souter—for the warrant-based rule noted in option
five.296 Justices scalia and ginsburg would again propose their “related evidence” rule but might not attract
any other votes, much less the three more required for a
majority opinion. as they did in Thornton, however,
these two justices would have likely concurred in the
judgment of at least a stare decisis majority opinion.
as is so often the case, the most important justice might have been Justice Kennedy. Judging from his
questions and comments during the oral argument,
Kennedy may have based the validity of the search on
grounds other than Belton’s familiar bright-line rule.
Justice Breyer confessed discomfort with Belton and indicated his preference for stare decisis.
The SuPreMe COurT’S rulinG
two months before the end of its 2008–2009
term, the United states supreme Court issued its opinion
in the Gant case. in a 5-4 opinion penned by Justice
stevens, the Court affirmed the holding of the arizona
supreme Court ruling that the evidence seized from respondent’s car was inadmissible.297 the Court held that
the Constitution permitted police to search the passenger
compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s
arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee
might have access to the vehicle at the time of the
search.298 it also created, in a transparent effort to fashion a majority, a wholly new rule for application in such
cases, holding that such a search may also constitutionally take place if there is reason to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.299 finding
neither condition present in the facts of Gant, the Court
held the search to be unreasonable.300
the Court shed light on its reasons for granting
certiorari in this case citing a “chorus” of courts, scholars, and justices who questioned the clarity of Belton as
well as its fidelity to the fourth amendment.301 in doing
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so, the Court turned a deaf ear to the much louder choir
of consistent conformity to the plain rule in Belton.
Understandably in light of its ruling, the Court
relied heavily on the holding in Chimel and was reminded that the exception to the fourth amendment’s
warrant requirement of a search incident to a lawful arrest applies only to “the area from within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.”302 if there is no possibility that
an arrestee can reach into the area that the police seek
to search, the two possible justifications for the exception are absent. this reasoning, the Court explained, assures that the scope of the search incident to the arrest
is “commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense” that could be concealed or destroyed.303
applying the Chimel exception to the automobile context, Belton, the Court continued, held that
“when an officer lawfully arrests ‘the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile’ and any containers therein.”304 the justifications of the Chimel warrant exception, said the Gant
Court, apply only when there is a reasonable possibility
of the arrestee gaining access to a weapon or to evidence
in the car.305 the holding in Belton was based in large
part, the Court said, on the assumption that articles inside the passenger compartment “are in fact generally,
even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach.’”306
Unabashedly seeking to avoid overruling Belton,
the Court rejected the almost universal notion that it had
established a bright-line rule in such cases. accordingly,
the Court refused to acknowledge that Belton directly
required courts to admit evidence seized from the passenger compartment upon the arrest of recent occupants
of vehicles.307 rather Belton, the Court claimed, has
been widely, though exaggeratedly, read as allowing the
search of the passenger compartment “even if there is
no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.”308 the Court attributed
this reading to Justice Brennan’s allegedly hyperbolic
dissent in Belton warning that the majority’s holding in
that case rested on “the ‘fiction . . . that the interior of a
car is always within the immediate control of the arrestee’” and that the search would have been upheld
“even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his
companions in the patrol car’ before conducting the
search.”309 the Court acknowledged that cases in which
the searches have been upheld in “this precise factual
Criminal Law Brief

scenario . . . are legion.”310 these cases, the Court admitted, include ones in which the handcuffed arrestee
has already left the scene entirely.311
the Gant Court, disingenuously in our view,
called this common application a “broad reading of Belton,” one which would “untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception.”312 the
Court accordingly rejected this “broad reading” ostensibly without overruling that case. it held that “the
Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”313 a
search of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest
is unconstitutional, the Court held, if there was no possibility of the arrestee gaining access to the interior compartment of the vehicle at the time of the search.314
in an effort to distinguish, rather than overrule
Belton, the Court relied heavily on the factual differences between Belton and Gant. in Belton, one police
officer—presumably in possession of one pair of handcuffs—was confronted with four unsecured arrestees at
the time of his search of the vehicle.315 in Gant, however, a total of five police officers handcuffed and secured in a patrol car the lone arrestee, who had recently
occupied the vehicle, and two other suspects.316 the
Court presumed that while Belton may have been able
to access the passenger compartment, gant, on the other
hand, could not have gained access to his car at the time
of the search.
By so ruling, the Court has left unscathed the result in Belton under the facts present in that case. the
Court seemingly fails to realize that these two factual
scenarios represent the polar extremes of a large spectrum of real world possibilities. inexplicably, however,
the Court concluded that it will be “the rare case” in
which an officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest
so that a real possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains.317 the Court then foreshadows, without so
acknowledging, the extensive litigation to come over the
factual issue of whether arrestees have a possibility of
access to the passenger compartment.318 it also gives no
weight to subsequent efforts by law enforcement to develop and employ strategies to permit searches of the
passenger compartment by leaving a suspect or suspects
arguably within reach of it.
accordingly, the Court’s ruling leaves many
questions unanswered that criminal justice practitioners
will have to address. is the ruling in Belton essentially
limited to its specific facts? Does Gant apply only to the
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situation in which the arrestee is handcuffed and in a pa- there will be reason to believe that the passenger comtrol car? What if the suspect is handcuffed but otherwise partment may contain evidence of the arresting offense
unsecured? What if no handcuffs have been applied but and in others it would not.323 the Court, however, gives
the suspects are placed up against the car or lying on the no guidance except that it holds that in Gant there is no
ground? What if one or more suspects are just steps reason to so believe—a conclusion with which we take
away from the car? must the suspects be as close as exception—the car could contain evidence of the crime
within arm’s length of the car to invoke Belton? how of driving with a suspended license. it is reasonable,
do glove compartments fit in? the Court clearly fails however, to believe that the license itself, the car registo recognize the extent of the confusion and the subse- tration, or other evidence supporting the charge could
quent litigation it has created by rejecting the bright-line have been found in the glove compartment or other parts
of the vehicle’s interior. again, the Court fails to recrule of Belton.
Gant is also silent as to the treatment of contain- ognize the consequences of the creation of this new exers within the passenger compartment. if suspects rea- ception. in short, in the majority opinion rejects what
sonably have access to the interior compartments of was an understandable, easily applicable bright-line
vehicles, do they automatically also have access to con- rule, replacing it with a two-part Chimel-centric analyttainers located within the compartment? the bright-line ical framework that will lead to extensive litigation.
Justice scalia’s conreading of Belton extended to any
curring opinion is a fascicontainers within the vehicle as well The Court...holds that in
nating exercise in judicial
as to the passenger compartment itself. there were no containers in- Gant there is no reason to obfuscation in which he unvolved in Gant and the ruling gives
so beleive...[that] the car abashedly announces that
he is joining the Court’s
courts no guidance about how it
should be applied in cases where con- could contain evidence of opinion despite his distents of a container are at issue. must
the crime of suspended agreement with half of it.
he enthusiastically emthe arrestee independently have realicense. It is reasonable, braces that part of the masonable access to the container?
opinion
that
Does it matter where the container is
however, to believe that jority
establishes the “evidence of
within the car? Does the kind of conthe license itself, the car the crime” rationale for pertainer affect the result? are containers that are more easily opened more registration, or other evi- mitting vehicle searches.
he does not, however,
likely to be accessible to the arrestee
dence
supporting
the
agree with the majority’s
than other more difficult to open conendorsement of a revived,
tainers? Will the answers to these
charge
could
have
been
questions have to await yet another
post-Belton application of
found in the glove
case?
Chimel. scalia writes that
Justice stevens’ opinion
surprisingly and without juscompartment.
“would retain the applicatification in our view, the Court then
goes on to carve out an additional extion of Chimel in the car
ception to the limitations of Chimel. this part of the search context but would apply in the future what he beruling is an audacious way to attract the vote of Justice lieves our cases held in the past: that officers making a
scalia and put together a majority of five votes. adopt- roadside stop may search the vehicle as long as the ‘aring Justice scalia’s concurrence in Thornton,319 the restee is within reaching distance of the passenger comCourt held that “circumstances unique to the vehicle jus- partment at the time of the search.’”324 he takes issue
tify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘rea- with this ruling, explaining that “this standard fails to
sonable to believe [that] evidence relevant to the crime provide the needed guidance to arresting officers and
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”320 the Court also leaves much room for manipulation, inviting offirecognizes that this new rule “does not follow from cers to leave the scene unsecured . . . in order to conduct
Chimel.”321 moreover, it does nothing to identify the a vehicle search.”325 he would “simply abandon” what
“circumstances unique to the vehicle context” that jus- he calls “the Belton-Thornton charade” and overrule
tify the new exception.322 it observes that in some cases those cases outright and simply adopt his “evidence of
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the crime” standard.326
Despite these views, he goes on to join the opinion of the Court. he acknowledges that no other Justice
shares his view about abandoning the application of
Chimel in these cases.327 But he finds it “unacceptable”
for the Court to issue a 4-1-4 opinion that would “leave[]
the governing rule uncertain.”328 he then asserts that
Belton and Thornton constituted a bright-line rule, albeit
one that endorses cases he considers unconstitutional,
and that the Court’s opinion is an “artificial narrowing
of those cases.”329 he joins the Court, not because he
agrees with it, but because he considers allowing the
bright-line rule to stand is the “greater evil.”330
in his dissent, Justice alito’s shares our view that
the Court, without so admitting, “effectively overrules
[Belton and Thornton] even though respondent gant has
not asked [the Court] to do so.”331 Despite the majority’s
refusal “to acknowledge that it is overruling Belton and
Thornton,” alito concludes, “there can be no doubt that
it does so.”332 alito believes that the majority’s overruling of Belton departs from the usual rule of stare decisis
without sufficient justification for doing so as required
by that doctrine.333 he argues that the case presents none
of the “special justification[s]” necessary for the Court’s
departure from a constitutional precedent.334 Justice
alito also takes issue with the “evidence of the crime”
basis for the search by questioning the standard of “reason to believe.”335
as expected, Chief Justice roberts and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer agree that Belton should be reaffirmed on stare decisis grounds. Justice Breyer writes
in dissent that Belton did indeed create a bright-line rule;
one which he believes sometimes leads to unconstitutional results.336 nevertheless, he says, there are no
grounds upon which to abandon the well-established
precedent that Belton represents.337 Proponents of doing
so have failed to meet their “heavy burden” for overturning a ruling on which there has been, as here, “considerable reliance.”338
The SuPreMe COurT’S rulinG
so, what about Justice scalia and the case of
thomas Jefferson’s carriage? What would the framers
have expected in the future President’s situation and
how would that apply to the one in which gant and the
arresting officers found themselves?
in order to determine what is and is not “reasonable” under the fourth amendment, Justice scalia always begins by looking to “the historical practices the
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framers sought to preserve.”339 he must have been frustrated in this case because the framers’ practices failed
to provide adequate guidance for how to rule. he could
not determine, and the litigants could not help him, what
James madison, John adams, and the other framers
would have believed to be reasonable. he was determined that because the “historical scope of officers’ authority to search vehicles incident to arrest is uncertain,
traditional standards of reasonableness govern.”340
those standards, he concluded, do not justify the Belton
bright-line rule.341 as we saw, however, the Justices, all
reasonable people, did not come to exactly the same
conclusion on what the standard for such searches
should be.
of one thing we can be sure: by its ruling in Arizona v. Gant, the supreme Court has completely reopened an area of constitutional criminal procedure that
had been settled for nearly three decades. in doing so,
it has released from Pandora’s Box what will be a deluge
of litigation as police, prosecutors, defense counsel, and
trial and appellate courts—including the high court itself—are compelled to grapple with the new standards.
it is precisely cases like Gant that explain the allure of the doctrine of stare decisis. it makes one long,
along with Justice scalia, for the simplicity of the 18th
century and the elusive wisdom of the case of thomas
Jefferson’s carriage.

1
andrew fois is a former federal prosecutor and assistant attorney general teaching Criminal Procedure at the georgetown University law
Center at which lauren simmons is a third-year law student.
2
129 s. Ct. 1710 (2009).
3
453 U.s. 454 (1981).
4
See transcript of oral argument at 7, arizona v. gant, 538 U.s. 976
(no. 07-542) (U.s. oct. 7, 2008), 2008 Wl 4527980 [hereinafter Gant
Transcript].
5
Id.
6
Belton, 453 U.s. at 8.
7
See id.
8
the fourth amendment to the United states Constitution reads as follows:
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or things to be seized.
U.s. Const. amend. iv.
in Terry v. Ohio, the United states supreme Court emphasized the importance of this right by reiterating that “[n]o right is held more sacred . .
. than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by

23

clear and unquestionable authority of law.” 392 U.s. 1, 9 (1968). as
originally included in the Bill of rights, the protections of the fourth
amendment applied only to actions by the federal government. Pursuant
to the Due Process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the fourth
amendment was incorporated and applied to actions taken by state governments in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.s. 643 (1961).
for most of its history, the supreme Court read the fourth
amendment to require a warrant supported by probable cause for all
searches and seizures of places, persons and things. its long held position had been that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the fourth amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United states, 389 U.s.
347, 357 (1967). the Court recognized “jealously guarded” exceptions
to the Warrant Clause that it declared to be constitutionally permissible
under the reasonableness Clause. one of those exceptions is the constitutionally based “search incident to lawful arrest” doctrine. See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.s. 752 (1969). the warrant requirement
has eroded to the extent that many believe it has been virtually abandoned and fourth amendment analysis turned on its head. in California
v. Acevedo, Justice antonin scalia points to the rise of the reasonableness Clause in asserting that the warrant requirement has become so
“riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable.” 500 U.s.
565, 582 (1991) (scalia, J., concurring). reasonableness has become the
“touchstone of the fourth amendment.” United states v. Knights, 534
U.s. 112, 118 (2001).
9
395 U.s. 752 (1969).
10
Id. at 754.
11
See id. at 753–55.
12
Id. at 755. See, e.g., Weeks v. United states, 232 U.s. 383, 392 (1914)
(affirming the right of law enforcement to confiscate any evidence on the
person of an individual lawfully arrested); Carroll v. United states, 267
U.s. 132, 158 (1925) (holding that anything unlawful found upon lawful
arrestee’s person or in his control may be seized); agnello v. United
states, 269 U.s. 20, 30 (1925) (setting forth dictum expanding search incident to arrest notion to include the entire location where the arrest is
made); marron v. United states, 275 U.s. 192, 199 (1927) (holding that
because officers made a lawful arrest, they had the right to contemporaneously search without a warrant any part of the arrestee’s property used
in the illegal activity); go-Bart importing Co. v. United states, 282 U.s.
344, 358 (1931) (distinguishing from the facts in Marron and holding instant search unlawful because the search was conducted in conjunction
with an obviously invalid arrest); United states v. leftkowitz, 285 U.s.
452, 461 (1932) (invalidating a search even though it had accompanied a
lawful arrest because the search was general and exploratory rather than
one targeted at evidence of and invited by the criminal activity for which
the accused was arrested); harris v. United states, 331 U.s. 145, 153
(1947) (sustaining a broad search of the home incident to arrest in order
to uncover evidence of the crime for which the accused was arrested);
trupiano v. United states, 334 U.s. 699, 705, 708 (1948) (holding that
search incident to lawful arrest is to be used sparingly and is justified by
the necessities of the circumstances and that the instant search was invalid because agents had opportunity to obtain a search warrant prior to
the search but failed to do so); United states v. rabinowitz, 339 U.s. 56,
58, 59, 61 (1950) (rejecting Trupiano rule and upholding the warrantless
search incident to lawful arrest for evidence of the type consistent with
the crime for which the accused was arrested, not just items of evidence
enumerated in the arrest warrant).
13
Rabinowitz, 339 U.s. at 63, 64; Chimel, 395 U.s. at 760.
14
Rabinowitz, 339 U.s. at 75, 78
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Chimel, 395 U.s. at 760.
Id. at 763.
17
Id. at 762–63.
18
See id. at 763 (explaining that the scope of a search of an area “must,
of course, be governed by a like rule”).
19
Id. at 763.
20
Id. (emphasis added).
21
See id. at 766–68.
22
See, e.g., United states v. Perea, 986 f.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that a search of arrestee’s duffle bag found in the trunk of the
taxi cab in which arrestee was riding was not justified under the arrest
power); Davis v. robbs, 794 f.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding
seizure of a rifle that was in close proximity to the arrestee at the time of
the arrest but not at the time of the seizure); United states v. sanders,
631 f.2d 1309, 1313 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding that in the course of a
search incident to arrest, police may retrieve evidence from the floorboard of an automobile after arrestees are no longer in it); United states
v. Dixon, 558 f.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding the seizure of a
bag from the interior of a car and the contents within the bag after arrestee has been removed from the car); United states v. frick, 490 f.2d
666, 669 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming the seizure of an attaché case from
the interior of a car after the arrestee has been removed because of exigent circumstances created by the mobile nature of the evidence, the possibility of an unknown accomplice or dangerous weapon, and the
likelihood that the arrestee would soon be released from custody). But
see, e.g., United states v. Benson, 631 f.2d 1336, 1340 (8th Cir. 1980)
(holding that a warrantless search of a tote bag was constitutionally invalid because there were no exigent circumstances that justified opening
a bag already in police custody); United states v. rigales, 630 f.2d 364,
367 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that a warrantless search of the contents of a
closed container seized in conjunction with a lawful automobile arrest
was only justified by the presence of exigent circumstances); hinkel v.
anchorage, 618 P.2d 1069, 1071 (alaska 1980) (asserting that a warrantless search of a purse in arrestee’s vehicle was lawful because the item
was immediately associated with the person); Ulesky v. state, 379 so. 2d
121, 126 (fla. app. 1979) (declaring that a search of purse was not justified as search incident to arrest because it was not located on arrestee’s
person or in the area within her immediate control at the time of the
search).
the supreme Court also revisited the issue several times. See,
e.g., maryland v. Buie, 494 U.s. 325, 327 (1990) (holding a protective
sweep may be justified by reasonable suspicion “that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or others”); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.s. 1, 6 (1982) (arguing that “the absence of an
affirmative indication that an arrested person might have a weapon available or might attempt to escape does not diminish the arresting officer’s
authority to maintain custody over the arrested person” and conduct an
automatic search within the grab area); vale v. louisiana, 399 U.s. 30,
35 (1970) (stating that the warrantless search violated the fourth amendment because the state did not meet its burden of showing exigent circumstances because the goods ultimately seized were not in the process
of destruction); Chambers v. maroney, 399 U.s. 42, 47 (1970) (finding
that “once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made
at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest”).
23
415 U.s. 800 (1974).
24
See id. at 807–08 (holding that edwards, who was arrested for attempted burglary and jailed at about midnight, could be legally searched
incident to that arrest the next morning).
25
Id. at 803–04.
26
414 U.s. 218 (1973).
15
16
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See id. at 236 (holding that the police officer had a right to search and
seize heroin capsules discovered in the course of a lawful search as evidence of criminal conduct).
28
Id. at 220.
29
Id. at 223.
30
See id. at 219, 236.
31
Id. at 224 (emphasis in original).
32
the cases make clear that the authority to search the arrestee’s person
is “affirmative” and “unqualified” making such searches not only an exception to the warrant requirement, but also reasonable under the fourth
amendment. Id. at 225–226. moreover, the authority to search the arrestee’s person included authority to seize and search any packages or
containers found on his person as an old cigarette package in robinson’s
pocket was found to contain heroin capsules. Id. at 236.
33
Id. at 224.
34
Id. at 227.
35
See id.
36
Id. at 235.
37
Id. (emphasis added).
38
Id.
39
See id. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring).
40
stePhen a. saltZBUrg & Daniel J. CaPra, ameriCan Criminal ProCeDUre 311 (8th ed. 2007).
41
See, e.g., United states v. Chadwick, 433 U.s. 1, 16 n.10 (1977) (distinguishing Robinson’s automatic search rule because “[u]nlike searches
of the person, searches of possessions within an arrestee’s immediate
control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy
caused by the arrest”); United states v. gorski, 852 f.2d 692 (2d Cir.
1988) (requiring that exigent circumstances are necessary to justify
search of bag during arrest). But see, e.g., United states v. morales, 923
f.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding search of defendant’s luggage as incident to arrest power because arrestee was holding bags when approached by officers, three feet away from bags when searched and not
handcuffed; and distinguishing the search in Chadwick as occurring too
long after arrest); United states v. herrera, 810 f.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1987)
(upholding search of arrestee’s briefcase as incident to arrest). Whether
the search precedes or follows the arrest does not affect the lawfulness of
the search. rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.s. 98 (1980). Police have the
authority to order an arrestee to move about a considerable area while
still permitting a Chimel search incident to arrest within all the areas so
moved into, even without any fear of the safety of the officer or risk of
destruction of evidence. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.s. 1 (1982). a
“protective sweep” of a much larger area than Chimel’s area of immediate control is reasonable for the sake of the officer’s safety. maryland v.
Buie, 494 U.s. 325 (1990). But police may not constitutionally search
an impounded car on a search incident to arrest theory after both the car
and the arrestee have been moved to the stationhouse. Chambers v.
maroney, 399 U.s. 42 (1970).
42
Belton, 453 U.s at 454.
43
Id. at 455.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 456.
46
Id.
47
Belton, 453 U.s at 456.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Belton, 453 U.s at 456.
53
Id.
27
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Id.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.; see also People v. Belton, 407 n.e.2d 420, 421 (n.y. 1980), rev’d,
453 U.s. 454 (1981).
58
Belton, 453 U.s. at 456; Belton, 407 n.e.2d at 421.
59
Belton, 453 U.s. at 455 (emphasis added).
60
Chimel, 395 U.s. at 763.
61
the choice of the word “arguably” suggests that the Court is not requiring that the interior of the automobile actually is, in fact, “within the
immediate control” of the vehicle’s recent occupant but only that it be
“arguably” within his or her immediate control.
62
Belton, 453 U.s. at 460.
63
See id.
64
Id. at 459.
65
Id.
66
Belton presented no issue of the legality of the search of respondent’s
person or those of the other three automobile occupants.
67
Belton, 453 U.s. at 460. footnote 3 of Belton emphasizes that its
holding is limited to those special circumstances when an arrest is
made “in this particular and problematic context” and does not change
Chimel’s fundamental principles regarding the scope of other searches
incident to arrest. Id. at 460 n.3. this disclaimer provides further evidence of the Court’s intention to carve out a bright-line rule for automobile arrests independent of the need for a showing of the rationales
underpinning Chimel.
68
Id. at 456.
69
the Court defines “container” broadly as “any object capable of holding another object,” id. at 461 n.4, and specifically authorizes the search
of a container whether it is open or closed. Id. at 461. it went on to dismiss the notion, put forth by the D.C. Circuit in Robinson, that the extent
of a search of a container must be defined by the likelihood of it holding
a weapon or evidence of the crime for which the person is being taken
into custody. Id. at 461. that provides further evidence that the Court is
not limiting the scope of the searches to those specifically consistent
with their underlying rationale. See Robinson, 414 U.s. at 235 (noting
that “[t]he authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial
arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence,
does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in
a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be
found upon the person of the suspect.”).
70
Belton, 453 U.s. at 460.
71
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Belton, in which he was joined by Justice
marshall, reluctantly acknowledges that the rule established by the majority constitutes a “bright-line” but implies that it may fade under the
brighter light of future cases. Id. at 463–64. he opines that the search of
the car would have been allowed by the majority even in the situation in
which the suspects had been handcuffed and safely placed in the patrol
car before it was conducted. See Id. at 468. Despite that recognition,
Brennan proceeds to list a number of possible factual scenarios which he
claims are not encompassed by the new rule. his strongest arguments
relate to the temporal proximity of the search to the arrest, although that
issue may be controlled by United States v. Edwards, 415 U.s. 800, 807–
08 (1974). many of his other hypothetical facts indicate a less than careful reading of the majority opinion. for example, he poses the questions
whether the interior includes locked glove compartments, whether there
are special rules for hatchbacks, and whether only containers large
enough to be “capable of holding another object” are covered by the
holding. Belton, 453 U.s. at 470. ironically, Brennan expresses his continued support of the Chimel standard and then rattles off an at least
54
55

25

equally complicated list of factors that he would use to determine the
issue of the arrestee’s area of “immediate control.” these factors include: “relative number of police officers and arrestees, the manner of
restraint placed on the arrestee, and the ability of the arrestee to gain access to a particular area or container.” Id. at 471.
72
saltZBUrg & CaPra, supra note 40, at 314.
73
Belton, 453 U.s. at 460.
74
for examples of cases interpreting “recent occupant,” see United
states v. gordon, 264 f. app’x 274, 276 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that arrestee, who was standing two or three feet from his vehicle after having
just retrieved a letter from the vehicle that formed the basis for his arrest,
was a “recent occupant”); United states v. Palmer, 206 f. app’x 357,
359 (5th Cir. 2006) (interpreting the “recent occupant” requirement put
forth in thornton v. United states, 541 U.s. 615 (2004), as not resting on
where an officer makes contact with a person regardless of whether it
was inside or outside a vehicle; the defendant parked his truck on the
side of the road and the officers initiated contact with him while he and
his companion exited the vehicle); United states v. Jones, 155 f. app’x
204, 208 (6th Cir. 2005) (“although an arrestee’s status as a ‘recent occupant’ may depend on ‘his temporal or spatial relationship to the car at
the time of the arrest and search,’ it does not require that he be within
reach of the automobile.”) (citations omitted); United states v. osife,
398 f.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005) (articulating that the fourth amendment permits police to search an automobile after arresting its recent occupant, even when evidence related to the crime is unlikely to be found;
defendant was determined to be a recent occupant after he got out of his
truck, urinated on the ground, walked into the store, walked back outside, and was standing next to the open driver’s side door of his truck
when the officers made contact with him. also, defendant was handcuffed and inside the patrol car when the officer searched the truck);
United states v. Bush, 404 f.3d 263, 275 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying the
logic of Thornton, the court held that because the officers saw the arrestee exit the vehicle and arrested her when she was in the process of
reentering her vehicle, the officers were permitted to search the vehicle
incident to arrest); United states v. herndon, 393 f.3d 665, 668 (6th Cir.
2005) (vacated on other grounds) (articulating that the defendant standing five feet away from the vehicle while the driver’s door was open was
a recent occupant); United states v. sumrall, 115 f. app’x 22, 26–27
(10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the arrestee, who was followed by police
for five or six blocks but met by police outside of the car after locking
the driver’s side door, was a “recent occupant”); United states v.
Poggemiller, 375 f.3d 686, 688 (8th Cir. 2004) (arguing that the defendant was a recent occupant even though the police initiated contact when
the defendant was standing 10 feet away from his vehicle); United states
v. Deans, 549 f. supp. 2d 1085, 1093 (D. minn. 2008) (upholding the
search under Thornton because where, as here, the law enforcement officials were engaged in an drug deal investigation and the suspected drug
dealer drove his vehicle to the predetermined site of the transaction, it is
reasonable to conclude the suspect might have further quantities of drugs
left in the vehicle even though he left the vehicle to conduct the transaction elsewhere). See also United states v. laughton, 437 f. supp. 2d
665, 673 (e.D. mich. 2006) (announcing that the search not justified as
search incident to arrest of a “recent occupant” of a vehicle because there
was no evidence the police officers saw the defendant in his car, and the
arrest did not occur in the vicinity of the car); state v. Dean, 76 P.3d 429,
437 (ariz. 2003) (following Glasco, the court held that defendant was
not a “recent occupant” because he had not occupied the vehicle for
some two and a half hours); People v. savedra, 907 P.2d 596, 599 (Colo.
1995) (finding that temporal proximity between the police encounter and
the defendant’s presence in the vehicle are the most important factors in
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determining whether a defendant is a recent occupant of a vehicle for
Belton purposes and stating that “Belton can include situations where the
occupant of a vehicle anticipates police contact and exits the vehicle immediately before that contact occurs”); a.t.P. v. state, 973 so. 2d 650,
653 (fla. Dist. Ct. app. 2008) (finding that the defendant was not a recent occupant because he was located thirty to sixty feet away from the
vehicle, thirty-five minutes had elapsed since defendant exited the car,
and defendant did not have the keys to the vehicle in his possession);
state v. Clark, 986 so. 2d 625, 629 (fla. Dist. Ct. app. 2008) (holding
that the defendant, who was arrested after getting out of his truck, was a
recent occupant); Black v. state, 810 n.e.2d 713, 716 (ind. 2004) (declaring the arrestee a recent occupant even though he was inside mechanic shop and the vehicle was parked outside); rainey v.
Commonwealth, 197 s.W.3d 89, 94–95 (Ky. 2006), cert. denied, 549
U.s. 1117 (2007) (applying Belton where arrestee was 50 feet from vehicle); state v. Wanzek, 598 n.W.2d 811, 816 (n.D. 1999) (indicating that
the defendant was a recent occupant even though not physically present
in the vehicle when the officer made the arrest); glasco v. Commonwealth, 513 s.e.2d 137, 142 (va. 1999) (stating that a defendant is a recent occupant when he is arrested “in close proximity to the vehicle
immediately after the [defendant] exits the automobile”).
for examples of cases interpreting the “contemporaneousness”
of the search to the arrest, see United states v. hrasky, 453 f.3d 1099,
1102 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 s. Ct. 2098 (2007) (finding that
the search was contemporaneous with the decision to place defendant
under arrest and a culmination of a continuing series of events at the
scene arising from the traffic stop, even though more than 60 minutes
passed between initial detention and search); United states v. smith, 389
f.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “a search need not be conducted immediately upon the heels of an arrest, but sometimes may be
conducted well after the arrest, so long as it occurs during a continuous
sequence of events,” and that in determining whether a search is a contemporaneous incident of an arrest, the focus should be “not strictly on
the timing of the search but its relationship to—and reasonableness in
light of—the circumstances of arrest”); United states v. Doward, 41 f.3d
789, 793 (1st Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that the Belton Court chose the
phrase “contemporaneous incident of that arrest’ rather than the less expansive phrase ‘contemporaneous with that arrest,” which “plainly implies a greater temporal leeway between the custodial arrest and the
search”); United states v. lugo, 978 f.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1992) (articulating that a search not contemporaneous incident of arrest when occupant was already en route to station); United states v. vasey, 834 f.2d
782, 787–88 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a search conducted between
thirty and forty-five minutes after defendant was arrested, handcuffed,
and placed in rear of police vehicle was not contemporaneous incident of
arrest); United states v. scott, 428 f. supp. 2d 1126, 1133 (e.D. Cal.
2006) (arguing that a fifty-three-minute delay between arrest and search
was reasonable because of the need to get the vehicle upright and finish
photographic scene); People v. malloy, 178 P.3d 1283, 1287–88 (Colo.
Ct. app. 2008) (finding that a half-hour delay in conducting search after
defendant’s arrest did not invalidate the search); state v. Badgett, 512
a.2d 160, 169 (Conn. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.s. 940 (1986) (holding
that the right to continue a Belton search “ceases the instant the arrestee
departs the scene”); United states v. harris, 617 a.2d 189, 193 (D.C.
1992) (agreeing with the federal courts that have held “a search of a vehicle, occurring shortly after the driver or an occupant has been placed
under arrest and restrained, is contemporaneous”); state v. homolka, 953
P.2d 612, 613 (idaho 1998) (determining that whether search is contemporaneous with arrest is judged by a standard of reasonableness under
the circumstances and that the search will generally be contemporaneous
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when conducted on the scene with arrestee still present); state v. giron,
943 P.2d 1114, 1120 (Utah Ct. app. 1997) (stating that contemporaneous
requirement “requires only a routine, continuous sequence of events occurring during the same period of time as the arrest”); state v. fry, 388
n.W.2d 565 (Wis. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.s. 989 (1986); state v. Ullock, no. 93-1874-Cr, 1994 Wl 100324, at *2 (Wash. Ct. app. mar. 30,
1994) (declaring that a forty-minute delay between arrest and search was
not improper, as it was reasonable for the officer to not leave arrestee unsupervised).
75
in response to Belton, police have developed simple and clear procedures for how to handle searches of automobiles incident to the arrest of
a recent occupant. See, e.g., virginia laW enforCement Professional
stanDarDs Commission, searCh inCiDent to arrest 2-5.4 (1999),
available at http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/cple/sampleDirectives/manual/pdf/2-5.pdf (finding that vehicles may be searched contemporaneous
with the arrest of the occupant or driver and should be conducted as soon
as practicable, even if the arrestee is not in the vehicle at the time of the
search); memPhis PoliCe DePartment, PoliCy anD ProCeDUres, seCtion 1: searCh anD seiZUre WithoUt a Warrant 4–5 (2006), available
at
https://kiosk.memphispolice.org/forms/Web%20Policy/Ch03/Ch%20iii
%20sec%2001%20search%20and%20seizure%20without%20a%20Wa
rrant.doc (proclaiming that after a lawful arrest, and an “individual is
placed in custody in or about a vehicle,” the officer may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle); alasKa DePartment of PUBliC
safety, legal BUlletin manUal: inCiDent to arrest e.3 (2007),
available at http://www.dps.state.ak.us/aPsC/docs/legalmanual/einCiDenttoarrest.pdf (citing case upholding search incident to arrest
after arrestee handcuffed and in police car); Pine BlUff PoliCe DePartment, PoliCy anD ProCeDUres manUal (2008), available at
http://www.pbpd.org/Policies%20PDf/Chapteriii/microsoft%20Word%20-%20Pol0352%20_search%20motor%20vehicle_.pdf (arguing that whenever
possible, search of a motor vehicle incident to arrest should be conducted
at the location of the arrest, but search of the vehicle may be delayed
when exigent circumstances are present); el Paso CoUnty sheriff’s
offiCe, PoliCy anD ProCeDUre manUal, searCh anD seiZUre/arrests
8 (2005), http://shr.elpasoco.com/nr/rdonlyres/44D9ee1B-DBB44D71-B6f0-75C141a40e10/0/702_policy.pdf (finding that when occupant of a vehicle has been taken into custody, the officer may search the
passenger compartment of the vehicle without a warrant).
76
See Belton, 453 U.s. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the
numerous questions and complexities that are raised because the majority abandoned the justifications for the bright-line rule of Chimel and did
not give the police any bright-line rules as to how to interpret “recent occupant” or “contemporaneous to arrest”).
77
See thornton v. United states, 541 U.s. 615, 623–24 (2004) (upholding under Belton a search of defendant’s vehicle, of which defendant was
a recent occupant, conducted after defendant was handcuffed and placed
in the back seat of a patrol car); see also atwater v. City of lago vista,
532 U.s. 318, 366 (2001); Knowles v. iowa, 525 U.s. 113, 117–18
(1998); ornelas v. United states, 517 U.s. 690, 697 (1996); California v.
acevedo, 500 U.s. 565 (1991); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.s. 367, 375
(1987); United states v. hensley, 469 U.s. 221 (1984); oliver v. United
states, 466 U.s. 170 (1983); michigan v. long, 463 U.s. 1032 (1983);
illinois v. andreas, 463 U.s. 765 (1983); illinois v. lafayette, 462 U.s.
640 (1983); texas v. Brown, 460 U.s. 730 (1983). But see Chambers,
399 U.s. at 47 (declaring that police cannot constitutionally search an
impounded car on a search incident to arrest theory after both the car and
the defendant have been moved to the station house).
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for examples of when courts have held a search valid when arrestee
was handcuffed and locked in the police car, see United states v. Weaver,
433 f.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 s. Ct. 2053 (2006)
(stating that Belton controls where the arrestee is handcuffed and locked
in a patrol car), cert. denied, 126 s. Ct. 2053 (2006); United states v.
Barnes, 374 f.3d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a vehicle search
upheld as incident to arrest after arrestee was arrested, handcuffed, and
placed in police patrol car); United states v. Doward, 41 f.3d 789, 794
(1st Cir. 1994) (finding that Belton is controlling where the police performed a contemporaneous search of a hatchback vehicle); United states
v. Patterson, 993 f.2d 121, 123 (6th Cir. 1993) (6th Cir. 1993) (ruling
that Belton controls, even when the vehicle was searched and impounded); United states v. Karlin, 852 f.2d 968, 972 (7th Cir. 1988)
(finding that Belton controls “without determining whether the officer
had rendered Karlin incapable of reaching into the van.”); state v. skaggs, 903 so. 2d 180, 182 (ala. Crim. app. 2004) (holding that Belton is
controlling where the police performed an automobile search incident to
arrest just before the suspect’s relative arrived to take the vehicle home);
People v. stoffle, 3 Cal. rptr. 2d 257, 263 (Cal. Ct. app. 1991) (ruling
that Belton permits vehicle searches incident to arrest where “the evidence discovered during the search had nothing to do with the crime for
which the person was arrested, or where it was just as unlikely as in defendant’s case that weapons would be found.”); state v. Waller, 612 a.2d
1189, 1192 (Conn. 1992) ; state v. hopkins, 293 s.e.2d 529, 531 (ga.
Ct. app. 1982) (holding that Belton controls when “articles in the passenger compartment are ‘unaccessible’ to the arrestee.”); state v.
Wheaton, 825 P.2d 501, 503 (idaho 1992) (holding that under Belton,
“[o]nce having made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, there is no need for further justification in order to search the
passenger compartment of an automobile); People v. Bailey, 639 n.e.2d
1278, 1282 (ill. 1994) (“[v]alidity of a Belton search is not affected by
the circumstance that defendant no longer had effective access to his vehicle when the search was conducted.”); state v. edgington, 487 n.W.2d
675, 677–78 (iowa 1992) (holding that Belton permits contemporaneous
searches of passenger compartments incident to arrest, but that searches
of a vehicle’s trunk must be justified on other grounds); state v. Press,
685 P.2d 887, 894 (Kan. 1984); state v. Jerome, 983 so.2d 214, 216 (la.
Ct. app. 4th Cir. 2008); hamel v. state, 943 a.2d 686, 696 (md. Ct.
spec. app. 2008) (ruling that “[t]he fact that hamel was secured and
without access to his vehicle did not cause the search of the locked glove
compartment to exceed the permissible scope of the search incident to
his arrest.”); townsend v. state, 681 so.2d 497, 504 (miss. 1996); state
v. scott, 200 s.W.3d 41, 44 (mo. Ct. app. 2006) (noting that “the concern for officer safety is applicable even when the officer has already secured the suspect in handcuffs. . .”); state v. gonzalez, 487 n.W.2d 567,
572 (neb. 1992) (holding that “handcuffing the arrestee and placing the
suspect away from the grabbable area of the vehicle does not prohibit a
contemporaneous Belton-type search of the vehicle from which the arrestee recently came.”); state v. miskolczi, 465 a.2d 919, 921–22 (n.h.
1983); state v. murrell, 764 n.e.2d 986, 992-93 (ohio 2002); state v.
reed, 634 s.W.2d 665, 666 (tenn. Crim. app. 1982) (holding that Belton controls even when the arrestee is handcuffed and in a non-responsive stupor); Pettigrew v. state, 908 s.W.2d 563, 570 (tex. app. fort
Worth 2d Dist. 1995) (“a search under Belton is allowed even when the
arrestee has been handcuffed and placed in a police car.”); state v.
moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah Ct. app. 1996).
for examples of when courts have held a search valid when
defendant arrested and placed in patrol car, see state v. valdes, 423 so.
2d 944 (fla. Dist. Ct. app. 1982) (finding that search was valid when the
defendant arrested and placed in patrol car); state v. Cooper, 286 s.e.2d
78
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102 (n.C. 1982); state v. Wanzek, 598 n.W.2d 811, 816 (n.D. 1999);
Glasco, 513 s.e.2d at 140; state v. fladebo, 720 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Wa.
1986).
Courts holding searches valid when arrestee handcuffed: see
e.g., United states v. mapp, 476 f.3d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding search of arrestee’s car conducted after arrestee handcuffed and
under police control); United states v. Currence, 446 f.3d 554, 559 (4th
Cir. 2006) (stating that the search of vehicle after arrestee placed in
handcuffs upheld as valid search incident to arrest); United states v. Cotton, 751 f.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1985) (declaring that the search of defendant’s vehicle after defendant was outside vehicle and handcuffed
upheld); United states v. Collins, 668 f.2d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1982);
stout v. state, 898 s.W.2d 457 (ark. 1995) (holding that the search of
vehicle after arrestee placed in handcuffs upheld); Black v. state, 810
n.e.2d 713, 716 (ind. 2004); Rainey, 197 s.W.3d at 95 (articulating that
the search of arrestee’s car upheld even though conducted after he was
handcuffed and “so far from his vehicle that it was unlikely he could
have accessed it”); state v. harvey, 648 s.W.2d 87, 90 (mo. 1983) (upholding the search of vehicle when arrestee was handcuffed out of the
car and presided over by two armed detectives).
Courts also recognize the nearly universal acceptance of Belton as a bright-line rule. See, e.g., People v. savedra, 907 P.2d at 598 n.1
(Colo. 1995) (citing federal courts of appeals cases, the court states that
“the passenger compartment is within the Belton zone even where the arrestee is away from the vehicle and safely within police custody at the
time of the search”); United states v. mendez, 139 f. supp.2d 273, 279
(D. Conn. 2001) (stating that a myriad of cases have concluded that the
“search of an automobile is generally reasonable even if the occupant
has exited the vehicle and is under the control of an officer”); traylor v.
state, 458 a.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 1983) (noting that Belton is applicable
to a search of a vehicle even though defendant arrested and in handcuffs); People v. mungo, 747 n.W.2d 875, 882 (mich. Ct. app. 2008)
(stating that Belton rule has “been interpreted to permit a full search of
the interior of an automobile even when the arrestee has been removed
from the car, handcuffed, and placed in a secure area, thus alleviating
concerns of officer safety and preservation of any evidence contained in
the car”); state v. White, 489 n.W.2d 792, 796 (minn. 1992) (“thus,
under Belton, an incidental search of the car is allowed even after the defendant is placed in the squad car.”); state v. rice, 327 n.W.2d 128, 131
(s.D. 1982) (accepting Belton’s reasoning and as a bright-line rule).
79
See, e.g., state v. greenwald, 858 P.2d 36, 43 (nev. 1993) (a search
conducted of defendant’s motorcycle after he was locked away in a police car was not a valid search incident to arrest); state v. eckel, 888
a.2d 1266, 1277 (n.J. 2006) (rejecting bright-line application of Belton
when defendant was arrested and placed in a patrol car under state constitution); state v. rowell, 188 P.3d 95, 101 (n.m. 2008) (rejecting Belton bright-line rule in favor of a search incident to arrest exception
“anchored in the specific circumstances facing an officer”); People v.
Blasich, 541 n.e.2d 40, 43 (n.y. 1989) (rejecting the Belton bright-line
rule and interpreting the state constitution to limit warrantless searches
of automobiles incident to arrest only to area from which arrestee might
actually gain possession of weapon or destructible evidence); state v.
Kirsch, 686 P.2d 446, 448 (or. Ct. app. 1984) (finding that the state constitution allows search incident to arrest only if necessary to protect officer or preserve evidence or when the search is relevant to the crime for
which the suspect was arrested); Commonwealth v. White, 669 a.2d
896, 902 (Pa. 1995) (arguing that a search incident to arrest is not justified when defendant was patted down, moved a short distance from the
car, and under close police guard); state v. Bauder, 924 a.2d 38, 46 (vt.
2007) (rejecting Belton under the state constitution); holman v. state,
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183 P.3d 368, 373, 377 (Wyo. 2008) (holding that under the totality of
the circumstances, there were no articuable safety concerns to justify a
search of the vehicle while the defendant was handcuffed and in a squad
car); see also Commonwealth v. toole, 448 n.e.2d 1264, 1268 (mass.
1983) (stating that a search conducted while defendant was arrested,
handcuffed, and in custody of two state troopers was invalidated under
state law).
80
see, e.g., United states v. lugo, 978 f.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1992)
(articulating that Belton does not control when an arrestee is no longer
on the scene); United states v. vasey, 834 f.2d 782, 787–88 (9th Cir.
1987) (finding that there was no exigency to justify a warrantless search
conducted thirty to forty-five minutes after an arrest and while defendant
was handcuffed and seated in the rear of a police car); state v. Badgett,
512 a.2d 160, 169 (Conn. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.s. 940 (1986) (declaring that Belton only applies when arrestee remains at the scene);
state v. Kunkel, 455 n.W.2d 208, 210 (n.D. 1990) (stating that a search
incident to arrest exception does not apply when vehicle is searched at a
location other than the scene of the arrest); see also Wayne r. lafave,
searCh anD seiZUre: a treatise on the foUrth amenDment § 7.1(c),
at 518 n. 92 (4th ed. 2004)[hereinafter lafave, search and seizure] (listing cases having an “on-the-scene requirement”).
81
See Belton, 453 U.s. at 458 (citing Wayne r. lafave, “Case-By-Case
Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 sUP. Ct. rev. 127, 142 [hereinafter lafave, The Robinson Dilemma] (approving of bright-line rules as easier for police to
apply)).
82
See, e.g., albert W. alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth
Amendment, 45 U. Pitt. l. rev. 227, 274 (1984) (stating that once occupants are removed from a vehicle, there is little chance they will be able
to get a weapon or destroy evidence in the vehicle); Jeffrey a. Carter,
Fourth Amendment – of Cars, Containers and Confusion, 72 J. Crim. l.
& Criminology 1171, 1173, 1217–21 (1981) (stating that the Belton decision enhanced the confusion concerning fourth amendment requirements for automobile and container searches); Wayne r. lafave, The
Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines”
and “Good Faith”, 43 U. Pitt. l. rev. 307, 325 (1981–1982) [hereinafter lafave, The Fourth Amendment] (arguing that Belton does a disservice to the development of sound fourth amendment doctrine);
lawrence gene sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 harv. l. rev.
251, 260 (1981); robert stern, robbins v. California and new york v.
Belton: The Supreme Court Opens Car Doors to Container Searches, 31
am. U. l. rev. 291, 317 (1982) (arguing that Belton diminished the
value in balancing the protection of privacy interests with the promotion
of law enforcement activities in the area of automobile and container
searches).
83
541 U.s. at 615 (2004).
84
Id. at 617.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 617–18.
87
Id. at 618.
88
Thornton, 541 U.s. at 618.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Thornton, 541 U.s. at 618.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
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Thornton, 541 U.s. at 618.
Id.
100
Id. at 618–19.
101
Id. at 619.
102
See Belton, 453 U.s. at 455–56.
103
See Thornton, 541 U.s. at 620–21 (noting that the Court’s dicta in
michigan v. long, 463 U.s. 1032 (1983), discussed the constitutionality
of a search where officers initiated contact with and arrested a suspect
after the suspect exited his vehicle).
104
Id.
105
Id. at 620.
106
Id. at 617.
107
Id. at 620.
108
Thornton, 541 U.s. at 620.
109
Id. at 620–21.
110
Id. at 621.
111
Id. (emphasis in original).
112
Id. (emphasis added).
113
Thornton, 541 U.s. at 615–16.
114
Id. at 622.
115
Id. at 623 (articulating that the search was contemporaneous to arrest).
116
Id. at 625.
117
Id. at 627.
118
Thornton, 541 U.s, at 625 (scalia, J., concurring).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 625–26 (quoting United states v. frick, 490 f.2d 666, 673 (5th
Cir. 1973)).
122
Id. at 627.
123
Thornton, 541 U.s. at 627–28.
124
Id. at 628; see also supra note 80.
125
See supra note 75. But see, e.g., lUBBoCK inDePenDent sChool DistriCt, Criminal investigations manUal Ch. 2, 7, available at
http://www.lubbockisd.org/Police/operations/Procedures-Ch2.pdf
(“[W]henever an officer makes a custodial arrest of a person in a vehicle,
the officer should search the person and his access area, for evidence and
weapons . . . [but the] search should occur at the time and place of the arrest.”).
126
Thornton, 541 U.s. at 632 (scalia, J., concurring) (citing Rabinowitz);
see Rabinowitz, 339 U.s. at 62–63 (upholding the search of plaintiff’s
car because there was reasonable belief evidence would be found).
127
Thornton, 541 U.s. at 630–31; see entick v. Carrington, 19 how. st.
tr. 1029, 1031, 1063–1074 (C. P. 1765) (disapproving a search of private
papers under a general warrant after an arrest).
128
Thornton, 541 U.s. at 631.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 632 (scalia, J., concurring); Rabinowitz, 339 U.s. at 56.
131
Thornton, 541 U.s. at 632 (scalia, J., concurring).
132
for example, would such a search ever be unreasonable or is it a
bright-line rule of reasonableness? must the arrest be of a recent occupant and the search contemporaneous to the arrest? if so, why? What is
the scope of the permissible search? may police look only in those
places likely to reveal such related evidence? What evidence is related
to each particular crime and what is not? What about containers? are
legitimate searches limited to those containers reasonably likely to contain evidence of the arrest crime? Can’t drug evidence be found anywhere? is a gun related to marijuana possession? What if evidence
unrelated to the arrest offense is found in the car in a place legitimately
being searched? how will we determine the reasonableness of police
decisions? Will the good faith exception apply?
98
99
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Thornton, 541 U.s. at 636 (stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. Justice o’Connor concurred, separately, writing that the majority’s opinion in Thornton was “a logical extension of the holding in New
York v. Belton, [but she wrote] separately to express [her] dissatisfaction
with the state of the law in this area.” Id. at 624 (o’Connor J., concurring) (citation omitted). the Court treated Belton searches as “entitlements” rather than as an “exception” of Chimel, she wrote, and “that
erosion is a direct consequence of Belton’s shaky foundation.” Id. o’Connor also expressed her agreement with Justice scalia’s approach but
did not want to adopt it in a case in which neither side has addressed the
issue. Id. at 625.
135
162 P.3d 640 (ariz. 2007), aff’d 129 s.Ct. 1710 (2009).
136
Id. at 641.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Gant, 162 P.3d at 641.
140
Id.
141
See id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Gant, 162 P.3d at 641.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Gant, 162 P.3d at 641.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.; arizona v. gant, 538 U.s. 976 (2003).
153
arizona v. gant, 540 U.s. 963 (2003).
154
76 P.3d 429 (ariz. 2003).
155
Id. at 437.
156
gant, 162 P.3d at 641.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 646.
159
arizona v. gant, 128 s. Ct. 1443, 1444 (2008).
160
gant, 162 P.3d at 641.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 643–44.
163
Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
164
Id.; cf. state v. Dean, 76 P.3d 429, 437 (ariz. 2003) (indicating that
the arrestee was not a recent occupant of the car).
165
Gant, 162 P.3d at 643.
166
Id. at 643, 643 n.2 (agreeing with scalia that applying Belton to Gant
facts “stretches [the doctrine] beyond its breaking point” (quoting Thornton, 541 U.s. at 625 (scalia, J., concurring)).
167
Id. at 643.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 644, 646 n.5.
171
Gant, 162 P.3d at 644.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
for examples of such cases, see id. at 645.
176
Gant, 162 P.3d at 649.
177
Id. at 645.
178
Id. at 646 (Bales, J., dissenting); see also United states v. Weaver, 433
f.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 s. Ct. 2053 (2006)
(leaving question of whether Belton rule is flawed to the supreme
133
134

29

Court).
179
Gant, 162 P.3d at 646–50 (Bales, J. dissenting).
180
Id. at 647 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.s. at 235).
181
Id. (quoting Belton, 453 U.s. at 454, 455–56 (citation omitted)).
182
Id.
183
Id. (quoting Belton, 453 U.s. at 461).
184
Gant, 162 P.3d at 647.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 647–48.
187
Belton, 453 U.s. at 465–66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188
Id.; see Gant, 162 P.3d at 648.
189
Gant, 162 P.2d at 648.
190
Belton, 453 U.s. at 456.
191
Id. at 462–63.
192
Gant, 162 P.2d at 648 (citing Belton, 453 U.s. at 468 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
193
Id.; supra note 78. But see state v. ritte, 710 P.2d 1197, 1201 (haw.
1985) (holding that the search was not within Belton because arrestee
was taken from the area and vehicle was not within his immediate control); state v. hernandez, 410 so. 2d 1381, 1385 (la. 1982) (articulating
that Belton’s rule does not apply “after an arrestee has been handcuffed
and removed from the scene, foreclosing even the slightest possibility
that he could reach for an article within the vehicle”); ferrell v. state,
649 so. 2d 831, 833 (miss. 1995) (upholding that the search of arrestee’s
vehicle conducted after arrestee placed in patrol car was not within Belton because rationales underlying exception were absent); state v.
greenwald, 858 P.2d 36, 43 (nev. 1993) (stating that a search of the defendant’s motorcycle after he was locked away in a police car was not a
valid search incident to arrest).
194
Belton, 453 U.s. at 460.
195
See, e.g., Gant, 162 P.3d at 648–49 (Bales J., dissenting); United
states v. hrasky, 453 f.3d 1099, 1103 (finding that the search was contemporaneous with the decision to place the defendant under arrest and a
culmination of a continuing series of events at the scene arising from the
traffic stop, even though more than 60 minutes passed between the initial
detention and search); United states v. smith, 389 f.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir.
2004) (stating that a search does not need to occur immediately after the
arrest but may be conducted well after the arrest as long as it is conducted in the course of a continuous sequence of events, and in determining whether a search is a contemporaneous incident of an arrest, the
focus should be “not strictly on the timing of the search but its relationship to (and reasonableness in light of) the circumstances of arrest”);
United states v. Doward, 41 f.3d 789, 793 (1st Cir. 1994) (emphasizing
that the Belton Court chose the phrase “contemporaneous incident of that
arrest” rather than the less expansive phrase “contemporaneous with that
arrest” which “plainly implies a greater temporal leeway between the
custodial arrest and the search . . .”); United states v. lugo, 978 f.2d
631, 635 (holding that a search is not a contemporaneous incident of arrest when occupant was already en route to station); United states v.
harris, 617 a.2d 189, 193 (D.C. 1992) (agreeing with the federal courts
that “a search of a vehicle, occurring shortly after the driver, or an occupant, has been placed under arrest and restrained, is contemporaneous”);
United states v. vasey, 834 f.2d 782, 787–88 (9th Cir. 1987) (asserting
that a search conducted between thirty and forty-five minutes after defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in rear of police vehicle
was not contemporaneous incident of arrest); United states v. scott, 428
f. supp. 2d 1126, 1133 (e.D. Cal. 2006) (establishing that a fifty-threeminute delay between arrest and search was reasonable because of the
need to get the vehicle upright and finish photographing the scene); People v. malloy, 178 P.3d 1283, 1287–88 (Colo. app. 2008) (finding that a
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half-hour delay in conducting search after defendant’s arrest did not invalidate the search); state v. Badgett, 512 a.2d 160, 169 (holding that
the right to continue a Belton search “ceases the instant the arrestee departs the scene”); state v. homolka, 953 P.2d 612, 613 (finding that the
determination of whether search is contemporaneous with arrest is
judged by a standard of reasonableness under the circumstances, and
search will generally be contemporaneous when conducted on the scene
with arrestee still present); state v. giron, 943 P.2d 1114, 1120 (Utah Ct.
app. 1997) (articulating that the contemporaneous requirement “requires
only a routine, continuous sequence of events occurring during the same
period of time as the arrest”); state v. fry, 388 n.W.2d 565, 577 (Wis.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.s. 989 (1986) (asserting that the right to a
Belton search continues after arrestee leaves the scene).
196
Gant, 162 P.3d at 649.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
See Belton, 453 U.s. at 469–71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200
Gant, 162 P.3d at 649 (Bales, J., dissenting).
201
Id.
202
Id. (quoting Thornton at 624 (o’Connor, J., concurring in part)); see
supra note 82.
203
Gant, 162 P.3d at 649–50 (citing cases rejecting Belton under state
constitution). See, e.g., state v. Pierce, 642 a.2d 947, 958 (n.J. 1994)
(rejecting Belton under the new Jersey state constitution); People v. Blasich, 541 n.e.2d 40 (articulating that new york rejects the Belton brightline rule and interprets the state constitution to limit warrantless searches
of automobiles incident to arrest only to areas from which arrestee might
actually gain possession of weapon or destructible evidence); state v.
Kirsch, 686 P.2d 446, 448 (finding that the state constitution allows a
search incident to arrest only if it is necessary to protect officer or preserve evidence or when the search is relevant to the crime for which the
suspect is arrested).
204
there were no recorded dissenting opinions against the granting of
certiorari. this case drew a number of amicus briefs on the merits from
the United states, law enforcement groups such as national association
of federal Defenders, national association of Criminal Defense
lawyers, the los angeles County District attorney on behalf of los angeles County, and the american Civil liberties Union of arizona and
twenty-five states. the supreme Court granted the United states time
for oral argument.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, arizona v. gant, 129 s. Ct. 1710
(2009) (no. 07-542), 2007 Wl 3129919 [hereinafter Petition for Writ of
Certiorari].
206
Id. at 8.
207
Id. at 11.
208
Id. at 13.
209
Id. at 8.
210
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 205, at 8.
211
Id. at 9 (quoting Belton, 453 U.s. at 459).
212
Brief in opposition at 12, arizona v. gant, 129 s. Ct. 1710 (2009)
(no. 07-542), 2008 Wl 4527980 [hereinafter Brief in Opposition].
213 Id. at 9.
214
Id. at 11.
215
Id. at 15.
216
Id. at 9.
217
Brief in opposition, 2008 Wl 4527980 at 19.
218
See Gant, 162 P.3d at 645 n.4 (noting cases which have applied Belton and Thornton to determine whether searches were conducted inci
dent to arrest); supra notes 79-80.
219
Brief for the Petitioner at 22–23, arizona v. gant, 129 s. Ct. 1710
(2009) (no. 07-542), 2008 Wl 4527980[hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner].
205
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Id. at 40–43.
Id. at 45–46.
245
Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 35–36, 41–42.
246
Id. at 39.
247
Id. at 37.
248
Id.
249
Id. at 37–38.
250
Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 6, 12, 18, 22–23.
251
Id. at 22–23.
252
Id. at 23.
253
Id.
254
See generally id. (Justice Scalia asking the most questions to both the
government and Gant).
255
Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 8.
256
Id. at 7.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 7–8.
259
Id. at 9.
260
Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 9.
261
Id.
262
Id. at 16–17.
263
Id. at 17.
264
Id. at 22.
265
See Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 21–22.
266
See id. at 25–26 (expressing uneasiness over the argument that police
may impound and search a vehicle for reasons not limited to public
safety or other similar rationales).
267
Id. at 26.
268
Id. at 32.
269
Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 32.
270
Id.
271
Id. at 33.
272
Id. at 5.
273
Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 25.
274
Id. at 4–5.
275
Id. at 13.
276
Id. at 24.
277
Id. at 24–25.
278
Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 45.
279
Id. at 20.
280
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
281
Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 8–9.
282
Id. at 9.
283
Id. at 20–21.
284
Id. at 20.
285
Id. at 6.
286
Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 6.
287
Id.
288
Id. at 10.
289
Id. at 10.
290
Id.
291
Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 10..
292
Id.
293
Id. at 19.
294
See id. Justice Clarence Thomas asked no questions and made no
statements from the bench during oral argument.
295
See Gant, 162 P.3d at 649 (Ariz. 2007) (Bales, J., dissenting). Bales
lists several alternative approaches to Belton, should the U.S. Supreme
Court decides to reconsider its holding. One is to specifically take the
approach adopted by the Gant majority. Second is to draw a new bright
243

Id. at 24–25; see also, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22–23, Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710
(2009) (No. 07-542), 2008 WL 2149864.
221
Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 37, Arizona v. Grant, 129 S. Ct.
1710 (2009) (No. 07-542), 2008 WL 2066112.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 39.
224
Brief of Respondent at 11, Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)
(No. 07-542), 2008 WL 4527980.
225
Id. at 15.
226
Id. at 38–41.
227
Id. at 32–34.
228
Id. at 42–45.
229
Gant Transcripts, supra note 4, at 7.
230
See generally id. at 4-14, 14-31.
231
Id. at 10, 23.
219
232 Brief for the Petitioner at 22–23, Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710
See generally id. at 4-14, 14-31
233
See id. at 9-12 (questioning the assertion that arrestees who are handcuffed and confined to a squad car pose an actual danger to police on
scene).
220

For examples articulating the special circumstances required to overturn established precedent, see, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808,
816 (2009) (“Revisiting precedent is particularly appropriate where . . . a
departure would not upset settled expectations.”); United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995) (articulating that “stare decisis cannot
possibly be controlling when . . . the decision in question has been
proved manifestly erroneous, and its underpinnings eroded, by subsequent decisions of this Court”; the role of stare decisis is reduced when
the rule is procedural and rests on an interpretation of the Constitution);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857
(1992) (finding that where “development of constitutional law since the
case was decided has implicitly or explicitly left [it] behind as a mere
survivor of obsolete constitutional thinking” a case is properly overruled); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (arguing that stare
decisis is not an inexorable command particularly in constitutional cases
because “correction through legislative action is practically impossible”)
(citation omitted); Arizona v. Rusmey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (“[A]ny
departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.”); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 n. 8 (1983) (declaring
that stare decisis does not apply when the Court is “convinced that [its
prior decision] is clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice”); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (stating that when
governing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned, “this Court has
never felt constrained to follow precedent”); Helvering v. Hallock, 309
U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (articulating that stare decisis “is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision”).
235
See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 616 (joining the majority opinion were Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Thomas).
236
Justices Roberts and Alito were not members of the Court for the last
decision regarding automobile searches incident to arrests. See id. at
616.
237
See Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 27-30 (questioning the underlying rationale that arrestees handcuffed and confined to a squad car are
actual threats to officer safety or evidence).
238
See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 625 (Scalia, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring)
239
See id. at 632 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting).
240
Gant Transcript, supra note 4, at 11.
241
Id. at 39.
242
Id. at 39–40.
234
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line, possibly excluding searches when the arrestee is restrained by handcuffs and in the police car or away from his vehicle, but the potential for
dispute of whether the facts of each case rise to this level are apparent.
Third would be to limit the scope of the permissible search to the passenger compartment and exclude containers. Finally, fourth would be to
allow searches of the car only when there are reasonable grounds to believe that it may contain evidence of the crime for which the suspect is
being arrested. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., joined by
Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
296
See supra Possible Holding 5, “Other Means to the End: Warrants
Based Upon Probable Cause or Other Exceptions.”
297
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724.
298
Id. at 1723.
299
Id.
300
Id. at 1723–24.
301
Id. at 1716.
302
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
303
Id.
304
Id. at 1717 (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460).
305
Id. at 1719.
306
Id. at 1717 (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460).
307
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720 (rejecting Arizona’s argument that the search
of Gant’s vehicle was reasonable under the bright-line rule established
under a broad reading of Belton).
308
Id. at 1718.
309
Id. (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 466, 468).
310
Id. (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624).
311
Id. (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 628).
312
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
313
Id.
314
See id. (holding that the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable because police could not have reasonably believed that Gant could either
access his car or the evidence contained within at the time of the search).
The Court rejected the argument that law enforcement had been trained
in and had come to consistently rely on the bright-line or “broad” reading of Belton for some three decades. The Court claimed the generalization underpinning the broad reading, that in most cases the arrestee
would have access to the interior compartment, had proven to be unfounded. Adherence to its faulty assumption, the Court asserted, would
lead to an unacceptable incident of unconstitutional searches. That argument, of course, begs the question whether or not the traditional reading
of Belton is constitutional in the first place. With this declaration that
there have been unconstitutional searches under current law, the Court is
inviting subsequent litigation seeking to apply Gant retroactively under
Teague v. Lane and its progeny.
315
Id. at 1722; see also Belton, 453 U.S. at 455–56.
316
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1715.
317
Id. at 1730.
318
Id.
319
See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).
320
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
321
Id.
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
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